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CHAPTER I

Introduction

The Second Vatican Council recognizes the existence
of a legitimate autonomy in the various areas of human
research and activity. 1

This autonomy does not, however,

divorce any activity from its concrete context in the life
of a believer or a non-believer.

Faith (or the lack of it)

cannot but have an impact on a practice which nevertheless
maintains its own autonomy and should be performed in
accord with exigencies irreducible to the truths of faith.
Gaudium et Spes # 38 contends that faith is beneficial for
any area of human life; the activities of believers should
deal with any area of life according to its authentic
exigencies.

The products of such a restored activity will

•

harmonize with the natural goal of that area of life, e.g.,
truth in the case of rational pursuits.
There is, of course, always the danger that nonChristian practices in various areas of life will influence
the believer's faith as much as they will be influenced by
his faith.

Thus in the course of a Christian's effort to

infuse a cultural situation with Christian faith, that
faith can be corrupted or disfigured by contamination with
practices or elements of the culture which violate their
1

2

own exigencies and which are therefore also inconsistent
with authentic faith.

Or faith itself can be used in such

a way that the exigencies of an area of life are violated.
Historically, the general possibility of distorted interplay between faith and the various activities of human life
has been discussed in the specific terms of the relation of
faith in the form of theological activity and reason in the
form of philosophical conclusions.

Among the most inter-

esting examples of the interplay of faith and reason may be
found in the works of Origen and his followers, particularly the three Cappadocians (Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus and
Gregory of Nyssa), Evagrius Ponticus, and Maximus Confessor.

The faith of Origen (especially as evidenced in his

early On First Principles) is often regarded as a corruption of Christian faith since Origen propounds philosophi-
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cal notions which have since been determined to be opposed
to Christian faith.

Origenism was, of course, condemned in

the 6th century:
At the Emperor's command a Council was convoked at
Constantinople in 543, and an edict drawn up in accordance with Justinian's views giving a long list of
Origenistic errors and their refutation, which was
signed by Pope Vigilius and the E. patriarchs.
[ ... ]
The Origenistic controversy was ended by the Second
Council of Constantinople (553), when Origen's teaching
was condemned, though it is uncertain whether the
Council examined his case afresh or simply adhered to
the decision of the synods of 543. (Cross 1010)
But if Origen himself is suspect within the Church, the
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same cannot be said for his Cappadocian followers.

Though

Basil the Great and Gregory Nazianzus compiled the Philocalia, selections from Origen's writings, they, along with
Basil's brother, Gregory of Nyssa, are recognized as among
the foremost and trustworthy defenders of orthodoxy.

Among

the three, Gregory of Nyssa is recognized as the most
intellectually adventurous, and there are in his works some
of origen's ideas which were condemned.

In view of Gregory

of Nyssa's interest in questionable ideas and his undoubted
basic orthodoxy,* his works provide excellent materials for
a case study of the interplay of faith and the autonomous
human activity of reasoning.

His Great Catechetical

Oration is recognized as the single best synthesis of his
thought; it deals with the propriety of divine incarnation,
perhaps the most difficult issue for a Platonic thinker .

•

Therefore we will focus our study on this work.

Differing Opinions On Gregory's Thought
All students of Gregory's thought acknowledge its
Platonic tendency.

This thesis is concerned with determin-

* "Lest the examples of Origen and Tertullian be
dismissed as unrepresentative on the grounds that both have
been condemned as heretics, the unimpeachable doctrinal
rectitude of a Gregory of Nyssa may be taken as evidence
for the thesis that the tension between biblical and
philosophical doctrine continued to characterize the
orthodox theology of the catholic tradition", Pelikan,
The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition Cl00-600), p. 50.
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ing the Christian character of Gregory's Platonic thought:
is it Platonic in a way compatible with Christian faith, or
Platonic in a way that is incompatible with Christian
faith?

Many commentators offer views on the degree to

which Gregory's thought was faithful to Christianity.

We

will first present those which regard the basic orientation
of his thought as non-Christian.
1.1. The first goal of H. F. Cherniss' The Platonism
of Gregory of Nyssa2 is to show, against a claim that
Gregory is primarily indebted to Stoicism, "the acceptance
by him [Gregory] of the fundamental metaphysical ideas of
Plato and his constant adherence thereto" (61); indeed
"Gregory has merely applied Christian names to Plato's
doctrine and called it Christian" (62):
Never does he [Gregory) forget or abandon this firm
belief that the real world is immateria1, intelligible,
and ideal. Of this world the soul is a part; there
is its true home and, striving toward it, thither
shall it one day return. Moreover, all the Platonic
attributes of that world are reproduced in Gregory.
It is beyond time and space, intelligible only to the
mind, and the mind -- in his stricter passages -- even
as in Plato is alone eternal. The material world is
somehow a copy of that real world; it is an image of
it and it partakes of it. (62)
Secondly Cherniss is intent on demonstrating that
Gregory was "willing to abjure intellectual integrity for
the sake of conservative orthodoxy" (58).

Later in this

chapter (see below, pp. 16-17) we will consider why
Cherniss is so intent on such a point.

His rationale for
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such an evaluation of Gregory's thought lies especially in
Gregory's explanations of the resurrection of the body;
such explanations are held to run counter to Gregory's
otherwise consistently Platonic understanding of the soul
and its perfection.

For Gregory, the soul

is immaterial and "has no community with the corporeal
solidity of living bodies" but is connected with the
body is some way which passes human understanding, and
at death it goes to the immaterial, intelligible world
which is its home.
So much would be clearly and consistently Gregory's doctrine were it not for the accepted Christian
dogma of the resurrection of the body. (56-57)
Though Gregory
has spent so much time adjuring men to avoid the
material world lest they should need a second death to
purge their souls of bodily attraction, (57)
his fidelity to dogma leads him to portray the soul of the
dead as standing guard over the elements of its former body
until, at the resurrection, it "calls them.out" (57) to
itself.

Cherniss comments that

to descend to such a materialistic explanation of
resurrection while everywhere else abhorring a doctrine
which contaminates the intelligible immateriality of
the divine world shows merely how desperate he was to
find even a bad explanation for the orthodoxy to which
he was pledged. (57)
In other places Gregory "practically denies" (58) the
resurrection:
The resurrection is the return to the original state
of our nature (which as we have seen was purely
intelligible) in which man was theion ti chrema [filled
with divinity].
From the body the pathe [weaknesses]
are inextricable; and once we have shuffled off the body
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we must not expect to find in that other life any of
the states peculiar to the body. (58)
Cherniss substantiates his case by noting that
Gregory accepts a Platonic notion which had not been
formally condemned by the Church in Gregory's time, i.e.,
origen's universalist notion of salvation (58), though,
presumably, it is no less logically connected with consistent Platonism than those positions he rejected.
In short, Cherniss regards Gregory's thought as
basically a form of Platonism inconsistent with Christian
dogma: Gregory "invented the means of making Christianity
an excuse for becoming a Platonist" (48).

Gregory's

thought is compatible with his faith only by violence.
1.2. A view similiar to Cherniss' was expressed in
Adolph Harnack's History of Dogma 3 : he writes that:
Gregory's theories also appear to be hampered by a
contradiction because they are sketched from two
different points of view. On the one hand he regards
the nature of man in spirit and body as constituting
his true being[ ..• ]. But on the other hand, though
Gregory rejected Origen's [and, by extension, Plato's]
theories of the pre-existence of souls, the pre-temporal
fall, and the world as a place of punishment[ ... ]
regarding them as Hellenic dogmas and therefore mythological, yet he was dominated by the fundamental thought
which led Origen to the above view. The spiritual and
the earthly and sensuous resisted each other. (III,
276-277)
Harnack expresses exasperation with Gregory's presentation
of the Eucharist in realistic terms:
even such a pronounced Origenist as Gregory of Nyssa
[ •.. ] as catechist propounded a physiological
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philosophically constructed theory regarding the
spiritual nourishing power of the [Eucharistic] elements
which were changed into the body of the Lord, which in
religious barbarity far outstrips anything put forward
by the Neo-Platonic Mysteriosophs [ .•• ] in the fourth
century Christianity was sought after not because it
offered to men a worship of God in spirit and in truth,
but because it offered to men a spiritual sense-enjoyment with which neither Mithras nor any other god could
successfully compete. Gregory wished for a spiritual
and corporal "communion and mixing" [ .•• ]with the
Redeemer. (IV, 293-294)
Harnack, a liberal Protestant "in spirit and in
truth," regards Jesus as
a great moral teacher of the coming kingdom [of God],
the fatherhood of God, the infinite value of the human
soul, and the commandment of love. All the rest that
the church has taught about Jesus is the result of
metaphysical speculation due to the increasing influence
of Greek philosophy on Christianity. (Gonzalez, 347)
It is little wonder that Harnack was exasperated with the
"mystery" character of Gregory's Eucharist.

Harnack does

not give Gregory's thought detailed consideration but would
clearly regard his interest in the Trinity •and the Incarnation as other than authentically Christian in orientation.
The spiritual orientation Gregory shares with Origen would,
no doubt, subject Gregory to the same accusation of
gnosticism as was leveled by Harnack at Origen (II, 341-2,
346, 360 and 365).
1.3. Anders Nygren's Agape and Eros4 presents the
traditional Lutheran notion of the corruption of nature and
the irrelevance of works to justification in terms of
contrasting notions of love.

He elucidates what he terms
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the specifically Christian "agape" love and the way its
distinctiveness has generally been missed by Christian
theologians.

Agape love is God's love, self-sacrificing

which gives without counting the cost or the "worth" of the
beloved: "Agape recognises no kind of self-love as legitimate" (217).

When the distinctiveness of agape is missed,

theologians conceive of love as "eros", man's acquisitive
drive to attain union with God by his own power, by his own
"works" rather than by faith.

Nygren treats the Platonic

tradition as the preeminent example of an Eros religion.
The goal of eros is for the naturally immortal soul to
liberate itself from sensory passions by an ascetical
ascent into a mystical state of union in which the beauty
of divine is enjoyed.

Nygren identifies Eros religion with

an egocentrism which is in the sharpest opposition to the

•

Agape religion of Christianity as reformed by Luther.

Eros

and Agape are irreconcilable: one is motivated by either
one or the other; there is no middle ground.
Nygren acknowledges that Gregory's Catechetical
Oration contains traces of an understanding of authentic
agape in the discussion of the humility involved in the
Incarnation (Nygren, 430-431) ; but
It is nevertheless not the Agape but the Eros
motif that really characterizes Gregory's thought.
Here we meet the attitude of pure mysticism, with its
whole apparatus of concepts that were traditional
ever since Philo and Plotinus. (431)
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Gregory's dependence upon the motifs of "purification" and
"ascent" to describe the spiritual life are pointed to as
sure signs that his notion of love (even when the Greek
"agape" is used by Gregory) is basically that of eros.
Thus Gregory's thought is unfaithful to Christianity; it
was an attempt to mediate the irreconcilable.

Gregory's

Platonic leanings determine the shape of his thinking
rather than his commitment to God's revelation in Christ.
1.4. Christopher Stead's "Ontology and Terminology 115
substantiates Cherniss' conclusions, though Stead offers a
slightly different psychological analysis as to why Gregory
was willing to flounder in philosophical inconsistencies:
where philosophical opinions seem to serve his theological ends he will press them into service; but he has no
concern to organize these opinions into a coherent
system. He lacks the essential attributes of the philosopher - the concern for consistency and the respect for
truth in all its forms, even disconcerti.llg truth, even
unprofitable truth. Called to the friendship of Christ,
he will not, like Aristotle, sacrifice that friendship
to truth; he believes rather that truth is only to be
found within that friendship. (107)
Stead is a clergyman trained in analytic philosophy and
whose historical scholarship focuses on patristic use of
philosophical concepts.

He finds that Gregory uses a

number of philosophical terms in inconsistent manners.

For

example, in places Gregory treats the division of creator
and creatures as the primary division of beings, whereas in
other places Gregory refers to the division of intelligible
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and perceptible as primary.

or, again, Gregory at least

once refers to a spiritual creature which has moved beyond
change whereas his overall theory demands that only the
creator be beyond change.

In sum Gregory's use of philo-

sophical concepts is an "uncritical borrowing [ •.. ]he
fails to take account of variations and conflicts in the
field of terminology." (112)
2. Now we will consider authors who regard Gregory's
thought as harmonious with his Christian faith.
2.1. Paul Verghese's "Diastema and Diastasis in
Gregory of Nyssa: Introduction to a Concept and the Posing
of a Problem"6 is occupied with demonstrating the clear
differentiation of Gregory's thought from the Neo-Platonisrn
of Plotinus.

He calls attention to a way in which Gregory

uses philosophy:

•

The question itself whether Gregory was a philosopher or not seems to be awkwardly posed. [ •.. ]
Distinctions between philosophers, theologians and
mystics would be unintelligible to this Christian thinker, who used discourse mainly [ ... ] to lead Christians
to thinking in accordance with eusebeia or true worship.
[ .•. ]He used pagan philosophy and the logical technology and terminology of the second sophistique, but his
thinking is certainly controlled by and based on the
faith of the Christian Church [ .•• ].(244)
Verghese proposes a more fruitful way of questioning
Gregory's philosophical achievement, part of which we will
employ in this thesis:
ask about the ideas and conceptions of reality current
in his time, both within the Church and outside, to
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which Gregory was responding. Does he use any critical
criteria for evaluating, questioning, rejecting or
reformulating these ideas and conceptions in a Christian
context? (244)
Verghese concludes that Gregory's thought differs
from Neo-Platonic thought in a non-arbitrary manner:
Gregory's view of the relation between God and
the world is [so] fundamentally different from that of
Plotinus or other[s] of the so-called Neoplatonic
school, that it is not correct to class Gregory among
Neoplatonists or Christian Platonists. [ ..• ] Neo-platonic cosmology which presupposes ontological continuity
between the One and the Many, the Plotinian views of
time as creation of the soul in its separation from the
one and of matter as the source of evil are rejected by
Gregory who must then be understood primarily as a
Christian thinker who used the categories of thought
current in his time, and not as a Platonist or
Neo-platonist. (257)
Verghese also suggests that there is "a basic
contradiction in Gregory's thought about the diastema"
(257), which might be "an unconscious lapse into Plotinian
views about which Gregory was most of the time rather

•

circumspect" (257-258).

Diastema refers to distension, the

dividedness which manifests one's difference from the
fullness of reality which is God in whom there is no
distension.

Gregory usually treats creation itself as

distension; however, there are passages in which Gregory
refers to sin as the origin of distension.

If distension

is a result of sin, then creation itself, which is distension, is evil in character.

Such a view could hardly

commend itself to a Christian thinker for whom God is the
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creator of the world.
2.2. Jean Danielou's introduction to his selection
from Gregory's mystical texts, From Glory to Glory,7 shows
that Gregory's Platonic terms have been so transmuted as to
be acceptable within a Biblical world of thought.

This is

often seen in the way Gregory differs from Origen's
Platonism.

For example, Origen holds that the "garments of

skin" of Genesis 3:21 refer to human embodiment itself
which is a result of sin.

But in Gregory's view

it comprises all that implies mortality and corruptibility [and only that]; and man's true nature is to
enjoy the incorruptibility of the risen body. (11)
Likewise Gregory distances himself from the
theory of real preexistence [of the human soul prior to
embodiment] along the lines followed by Origen in
dependence on Philo. But in man created in God's image
he sees the preexistence of human nature in the perf ection of the divine knowledge--such as it will be only
at the end of time. (14)
•
Danielou points out a number of other ways in which
Gregory differs from Platonic thought in principled
manners.

Gregory is said to acknowledge

that the divine nature transcends all determination.
This is not, however, a negative sort of transcendence,
like that of the Neo-platonic One. [ ... ]ecstasy is
linked with the proximity, that is, the presence, of
God; hence the soul is united with the living God of
the Bible and not with the abstract essence of the Neoplatonists. Finally, the most important point is that
faith is seen to be the only way by which the soul can
be united to the Transcendent. (36)
Or:
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Gregory's notion of Eros has nothing in common with the
Platonic concept of love--an unfortunate confusion of
which Anders Nygren is guilty in his chapter on Gregory
in his book Eros and Agape. [ ••• ] Gregory uses the word
because he feels that the passionate aspect of Eros is
a more suggestive symbol for the passivity of the soul
as it is overpowered by the revelation of the infinite
beauty of God. (43-44)
Danielou finds the finest example of Gregory's
originality and irreducibility to Platonism in his concept
of change as a positive reality.

Both Plato and Gregory

assert the changelessness of the divine (47), but they have
different rationales for such assertions.

Change, accord-

ing to Plato, is necessarily opposed to goodness.

But a

notion of change as necessarily associated with imperfection seems inconsistent with the way God is portrayed in
the Bible as reacting to human choices and needs.

Has

Gregory's use of the Platonic concept involved a betrayal
of the Bible?

•

Gregory had to destroy the equation: good=immutability,
and evil=change. And consequently he had to show the
possibility of a type of change which would not merely
be a return to immobility--that is, to the mere negation
of change. (47)
Gregory distinguishes that change which is associated with
imperfection from that change which is characteristic of
human perfection in union with God:
It is thus a mistake to imagine perfection as a state
of complete immobility in restored innocence. Perfection is progress itself: the perfect man is the one who
continually makes progress. (52)
A type of change which is a perfection is radically opposed
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to the basic orientation of Platonic thought.

The purport-

edly non-Biblical Platonist Gregory has in effect opened up
Platonic concepts from within such that they function,
coherently, within a thoroughly distinct world of thought.
2.3. David Balas' "Eternity and Time in Contra
Eunomium"B corroborates Danielou's conclusion:
whereas in his conception, of eternity (as timeless
life) and of the temporality of spiritual creatures as
distended life[,] Gregory's view seems to be close to
that of Plotinus, his positive notion of this "outstretched" existence as (the possibility of) continuous
progress sets him (it seems to me} very much apart from
the Platonic tradition. (149}
Balas in effect responds to Verghese' question about the
consistency of Gregory's usages of diastema by distinguishing two meanings of distention:
man has to transcend the temporality of the material
world and of a human life intricated in it. This true
perfection, however, does not consist in escaping
"distension" but rather in a continuous :distension" of
a higher order. (149}
2.4. Robert Harvanek argues in his dissertation9:
Undoubtedly Gregory's effort to create his
Christian Philosophy remained imperfect in many points.
He did not always adequately succeed in correcting his
Platonism nor in expressing the Christian tradition.
His doctrines call for numerous precisions and even
some excisions that would be the work of the later
Christian centuries. But this does not detract from the
conclusion that Gregory is not a Platonist with some
Christian accretions. The truth is just the opposite:
he is a Christian who has not always succeeded in
clearly reconciling his Platonism with his Christian
principles. (243}
He shows the importance of Gregory's notion of creation for
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each of the main areas of Gregory's concern (241-242), and
It is precisely because he [Gregory] did not rest with
the [Platonic] distinction between the intelligible and
the sensible but went beyond and above it to the
distinction of creature and creator that Gregory was not
merely a Platonist but a Christian Platonist.
It was
the discernment of this higher and more fundamental
distinction at the basis of all reality that marked
Gregory's advance over pagan Platonism. (99)
cherniss' failure to grasp Gregory's principled differences
with Plato are pointed out (e.g., 106, 107, 127-128, 140).
2.5. John Cavarnos' "The Relation of Body and Soul in
the Thought of Gregory of NyssanlO shows that Gregory has a
consistent account of the relation of soul and body in
spite of its difference in several respects from a Platonic
account.

The difference is due, in part, to Gregory's

appropriation of various Aristotelian concepts.

Gregory

insists, with Plato, on the immateriality, indivisibility
and imperishability of the soul (64) yet, with Aristotle,

•

acknowledges that the soul naturally integrates and
enlivens its body (65).

The soul is even acknowledged to

depend upon a properly disposed body in order to act.

Even

after death the soul is oriented to its body until, at the
resurrection, they are united in perfection (76).

Those

passages in which Gregory emphasizes how the body ties the
soul down are interpreted as moral rather than ontological
points.

That is, evil results from the soul's subordina-

tion of itself to its body (72) rather than using its body
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in accord with the divinely created nature of soul and body
( 69 -10).

These views of Gregory are thus compatible with

the Biblical notion of the goodness of all creation.

The problem Which Emerges From the Secondary Literature
It is not beside the point to note that the opposed
evaluations of the Christian character of Gregory's thought
are correlated to the various authors' views regarding the
character of reason and faith as well as the possible
compatibility between them.

Cherniss, Harnack, Nygren are

certainly not sympathetic to Catholic attempts to integrate
faith and reason whereas Danielou, Balas and Harvanek are
catholic.

The point of this observation is that one's

understanding of both rationality and of Christianity and
of their compatibility affects the approach taken to
Gregory's texts.

•

Harnack's ethical Christianity provides

the context within which Gregory's reasoning inevitably
appears as gnostic and therefore non-Christian.

Nygren's

view of Platonic reasoning as "erotic" and, therefore,
sharing in the corruption of all natural striving conduces
to his negative evaluation of Gregory's thought.

Cherniss

displays his own philosophy in the following remark:
Plato had known the temper of the blade of human knowledge and would not bend it to the snapping-point.
Where the mind of man cannot go with Reason for its
guide, he let it fly with Fancy; but he always warned
his readers that of the Beyond he could tell only "a
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likely story." (64)
And he begins his work thus:
Reason is mighty for its own destruction. For
it casts a spell upon men--not to serve it as a mistress--but to use it as a handmaiden. So that faith,
drawn by the spell of reason, enlists the service of
this, her natural enemy; and in the final syllogism we
find a conclusion drawn by faith from reason and the
contradictory theses of the two incompatible sides of
human mentality amalgamated to form a doctrine which
claims to withstand successfully the attack of either.

(1)
rt often appears that Cherniss undertook his study of
Gregory, and that he notices in Gregory's texts only that
which he did, in order to illustrate his belief in the
incompatibility of that which he terms faith and reason.
The Catholic writers, due probably to their assumption that reason and faith can be compatible and to their
familiarity with later Scholastic developments illustrating
that compatibility, are sensitive to points•missed by the
other thinkers such as Gregory's departures from Platonic
orthodoxy; as a result they are able to discern a reasoned
coherence to Gregory's thought that escapes the others.
Is there any way to pose our question as to the basic
character of Gregory's thought without begging the question
by simply postulating a particular understanding of
rationality and Christianity?

In the final analysis there

is not any such way, but prior to the final analysis there
is an important piece of work to which this thesis will be
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directed.

We will pursue Verghese's suggested question:

Does he [Gregory] use any critical criteria for evaluating, question, rejecting or reformulating these ideas
and conceptions in a Christian context? (244)
we are going to identify the implicit criteria with which
Gregory identifies error in the opinions with which he
deals.

These criteria, if indeed there are any rational

criteria, will allow us to show the direction of Gregory's
thinking by distinguishing its goal from that to which it
is opposed.

If he has no consistent critical criteria for

rejecting a particular, e.g., Platonic, view other than the
fideistic criteria of acceptability to the Church's
catechetical tradition, then we can conclude that Cherniss
is correct.

on the other hand, if we discern meaningful

criteria in Gregory's discussions then, whether or not
those criteria are correct, we will not be able to chal-

• 58).
lenge his "intellectual integrity" (Cherniss,
Our final evaluation cannot do without a notion of
authentic Christianity by which to judge Gregory's criteria.

We will presume the orthodox tradition, as very

recently exemplified in Vatican II, as the criterion of
Christianity.

To argue for this understanding of Chris-

tianity cannot occupy us since to do so would engage us in
controversies which far exceed the scope of this work.

We

may mention, however, that employing the Catholic notion of
Christian faith and reason has the advantage that it does
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not rule our question out in an a priori fashion.

It

acknowledges the possibility that any particular theologian's thought can proceed in accord with both faith and
reason or can fail to do so.

Some notions of Christianity

would regard any theological attempt to use reason as an g
priori betrayal of Christian faith; our question will not
be considered worthwhile by such.

However, our identifi-

cation of the criteria implicit (or explicit) in Gregory's
thought could be useful even for those with non-Catholic
notions of reason and Christian faith.

They can compare

Gregory's criteria with their own and judge accordingly.

The Distinctive Method of This Study
This work differs from that of previous thinkers
especially by the aspect of the method by which the

•

critical criteria of Gregory's thought are to be clarified.
This element may be called "contrastive projection".

I

assume that one ought not determine the character of a
person's thinking solely from the articulations which he
achieves; the attempt to do so confuses where he has gotten
and where he is heading.

The latter - not the former -

determines the thought's dynamism, whether or not that
thinking articulates its topic successfully.
But can anything be known about the goal of someone's
thinking apart from his actual achievement?

We can know

20

what the final goal will exclude (and in philosophical/theological topics this is quite significant), since the
foils against which the thinker's articulations develop are
present at all stages of development, whether or not he has
successfully offered positive alternatives.

The articula-

tions sought in theological thinking always bear on (though
are not reducible to) controversies regarding the meaning
of being.

Where being is at stake the law of excluded

middle applies.

The contradictories of a thinker's

philosophical foils, and their implications, are necessarily part of the goal at which his thinking aims.

Thus we

can project the character of the articulation sought by
Gregory, and we can clarify the dynamism of his thought by
"contrastive projection" from its philosophical foils.
Our study of the character of Gregory's thought will

•

begin by providing the context of his foils.

We will

present his positive view of his work's audience and
purpose, as well as his view of the salvational nature of
truth and its Christological and sacramental dimensions.
Our characterization of the dynamism of Gregory's
thought from positive indications will be complemented by
our characterization from his foils.

The latter will be

less revealing of the richness of his thought; but it will
highlight the commitments apart from which his thought is
misconstrued.

Positive indications (his own or those
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implicit in his historical situation) could well be no more
than commonplaces, parts of his inheritance which, "given
world enough and time", he would have rejected or somehow
transposed.

For example, should Gregory's works include

speculative hypotheses which are inconsistent with laterdefined dogma, one still lacks evidence of a non-Christian
dynamism in his thinking if those proposals were offered in
the course of rebutting foils which contradict dogma.
However, if among Gregory's foils is found a proposition
later defined as Christian dogma, then one has strong
evidence that the dynamism of his thought is not that of
Christian faith.

In any case, we will seek to clarify the

dynamism of his thought by a study of both his stated
concerns and views and of his choice of foils .

•

Conclusion

We will discuss the perennial topic of the relation
between faith and reasoning by studying Gregory of Nyssa's
criteria for philosophical error in his Great Catechetical
Oration.

Commentators disagree whether he has rational

criteria and, if he does, whether they are harmonious with
his faith.

We will present evidence on the issue from his

stated views and from his choice of foils.
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CHAPTER II
'.I}le Truth of Christian Faith vis-a-vis Philosophical Error

The present chapter will sketch Gregory's notion of
the truth of Christian faith and its opposition to error as
far as can be determined from Gregory's positive statements
in his Great Catechetical Oration.*

His notion of truth

and falsity will go far toward determining the Christian
character of his thought.
parts.

This chapter proceeds in five

we will first characterize LK's purpose by means of

a study of its stated audience.

Second, we will present

the main arguments of LK and point out the congruence
between the organization of the work and its overall
purpose.

Third, we will clarify the salvational importance

of the truth which LK serves.

Fourth, we will take up the

concrete Christological, incarnational shape-' taken by
salvation.

Fifth, we will consider the ecclesiological

mediation of the incarnation; this will clarify the sense
in which Gregory's catechetical work is part of the overall
salvational process.
* Henceforth referred to in our text as LK, from the
Greek title, Logos Katechetikos; we will refer to the
work's section number and the page reference in the English
translation by Hardy, "Address on Religious Instruction."
When changes are made in the translation, Migne's Patrologia Graeca (PG) will be cited.
23
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aµdiences and Therapeutic Purpose
The immediate audience for LK is the leaders of the
church in their capacity as teachers:
Religious instruction is an essential duty of the
leaders "of the mystery of our religion." By it the
church is enlarged through the addition of those who
are saved, while "the sure word which accords with the
[traditional] teaching" comes within the hearing of
unbelievers. (Introduction: 268)
Gregory alludes to Scriptural exhortations (1 Tim 3:16 and
Titus 1:9) that the Church's overseers must hand on the
Christian revelation so as to guard the faithful from
heresy.

The content which the leaders "of our religion"

are to teach is none other than the "mystery", the revelation which has been handed on in the Church from generation
to generation.
The ultimate, though indirect, beneficiaries of LK

•

are all those who presently reject the truth of the
"mystery of our religion".

Gregory's stated ultimate

audience includes Hellenistic polytheists and atheists,
Christian heretics, as well as Jews.

LK is not composed

for these people to read; rather it is designed to teach
the Church's leaders the best way to defend the reasonableness of Christian claims to each of these groups.

It is

"in house" Christian literature.
In what sense will these polytheists, atheists,
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heretics and Jews benefit from appropriate Christian
•

?

teaching.

To the degree that someone is simply ignorant of

Christian teaching his ignorance can be overcome by a
simpler teaching than that contained in LK.

Gregory's

concern in LK is those who have already heard the Christian
message but have not accepted it because they have some
objection to it.

These will be benefited by the correction

of their confused or otherwise false underlying ideas which
militate against their acceptance of Christian truth:
A man of the Jewish faith has certain presuppositions;
a man reared in Hellenism, others. The Anomoean,
the Manichaean, the followers of Marcion, Valentinus,
and Basilides, and the rest on the list of those astray
in heresy, have their preconceptions, and make it
necessary for us to attack their underlying ideas in
each case. (Ibid.)
Any presuppositions or underlying ideas which prevent
the acceptance of Christian truth are a form of "disease"
and a disease of the worst kind - intellectaa1.

The

teaching which Gregory is encouraging in LK will serve to
heal the intellectual disease from which non-Christians
suffer; such teaching is a "method of therapy".
The purpose of therapeutic discussions is "that the
truth may finally emerge from what is admitted on both
sides" (Ibid., 269).

Thus

The teaching of the Jew is invalidated by the acceptance of the Word and by belief in the Spirit; while the
polytheistic error of the Greeks is done away, since
the unity of the nature cancels the notion of plurality.
Yet again, the unity of the nature must be retained from
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the Jewish conception, while the distinction of Persons,
and that only, from the Greek. The irreligious opinion
on each side finds a corresponding remedy. (3:274)
In sum, Gregory's intended audience comprises two groups.
Directly he attempts to help the Church's intellectual
"physicians" by offering proper therapeutic techniques.
Indirectly he aids those afflicted with intellectual
diseases, those whose preconceptions and obstruct their
acceptance of the truth of the Christian message.

We may

surmise from the sort of objections with which the bulk of
LK is occupied, objections to the Incarnation based on the
presumption that the material world is somehow inherently
evil, that the majority of those for whom Gregory writes
are neither Jews nor atheistic Greeks but are religious
minded Greeks and heretical Christians.

Jewish topics

probably enter Gregory's discussion not because he dealt
with many Jews but because even Hellenists tnew that the
Christian self-understanding included both a connection
with Jews and difference from them.

Contents and Organization
LK's first substantive discussion is a brief defense
of the reasonableness of Christian monotheism and Trinitarianism.

The former is a stumbling block for Greek polythe-

ists and the latter for Jews and heretical Christians.
Atheists are to be met with standard arguments from the
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"skillful and wise arrangement of the world" (Introduction,
2 69).

The defence of monotheism relies on the commonly

accepted premise of "the perfection of the divine nature"
(Ibid.).

Gregory points out that since God's perfection is

unlimited, it can occur in only one instance.

A distinc-

tion can be drawn between two beings only if one lacks some
perfection possessed by the other (Ibid.); thus a second,
or third .. .', distinct purportedly perfect nature could not
in fact be perfect.
God's perfection is also used to establish the
reasonableness of professing the distinct subsistence of
the Reason or Word, logos, and Spirit, pneuma, within God
against the Jews or heretical Christians (1-4:270-275).
For the divine nature cannot be less perfect than the
nature of human beings who have a share in reason and
spirit.

The divine Word and Spirit must haTe a distinct

subsistence with none of the imperfections of human reason
and spirit.

Thus the Word cannot lack the life, goodness,

or power by which creation occurs and is ordered.
Some standard objections to the providential ordering
of creation are then dealt with in sections 5-8.

The

doctrine that man is the image of God is def ended from
those who object by pointing to the non-divine state of
man's life:
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man's life is fleeting, subject to passion, mortal,
liable in soul and body to every type of suffering.
(5:277)
Gregory meets this type of objection with the traditional
distinction between God's basic intention for our nature
and what has become of our nature due to sinful uses of our
freedom.

The present state of our life is posterior to the

nature with which we are created.

The disabilities of the

present state of our life are not part of our nature but
exist only in view of sin.

Gregory insists that evil is a

privation which results from the evil free choices of
creatures (5:277-278).

Gregory presents the view that

human sin was occasioned by disorders wrought by a sinful
angelic being (6:278-281).

Gregory takes a "transcendental

turn" so as to clarify why some mistakenly attribute the
evils of our present life to God: "They define the good by
reference to the enjoyment of bodily pleasure" (7:281).
Thereby they misconstrue the origin and character of those
evils.

The non-divine aspects of our life are as they are

because God foresaw the sinful use of freedom and provided
for salvation; God's perfection is not overturned by the
sins of creatures (8:282-286).

In this way Gregory meets

one set of objections made to Christianity on the basis of
the commonplace of the divine perfection.
The central topic of LK, the reasonableness of the
Incarnation of the divine Logos, follows.

Once again, the
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commonplace of God's perfection is advanced against a
Christian claim.

For, it is objected, Jesus' birth,

growth, the natural activities of human life, the sufferings and death, even the resurrection from death are
"unbefitting a right conception of God" (9:286).
proceeds to meet such objections in sections 9-32.

Gregory
His

arguments work with the general notion that
one thing alone in the universe is by nature shameful,
viz., the malady of evil, while no shame at all attaches
to what is alien to evil. (9:287)
He applies this general principle to the various aspects of
human life which were held to be unbefitting of divinity;
he shows that they are not unbefitting.

Thus the Christian

profession of the Incarnation of the divine Logos in no way
implies a notion of God as imperfect.

These objections are

the sort that would be raised not by Jews, who appreciated
the goodness of the created order, but by

H~llenists.

We

can safely judge that Gregory's catechetical work was
largely occupied with such Hellenists.
Gregory shows that Christian doctrine concerning the
facts of Jesus's life makes a reasonable case that he is
not an ordinary mortal but is divine (12-13: 289-290,
32:311).

Furthermore, the facts of the history of the

destruction of idolatry and of Judaism (18-19:295-296) are
adduced as further evidence of the Christian claim regarding Jesus.

These latter points would have had no small
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impact in Gregory's time since Julian (the apostate) ruled
only two decades earlier (361-363).

Julian's

policy was to degrade Christianity and promote paganism
by every means short of open persecution. He sought to
re-establish the heathen worship throughout the empire;
ordered all instruction in the Imperial schools to be
completely paganized [ .•. ]. He also attempted to weaken
the Church internally by allowing all exiled Bishops to
return to their sees with a view to created dissensions.
(Cross 765)
He also attempted to rebuild Jerusalem for the Jews as a
means of discrediting the standard Christian argument.
Julian, of course, died and the emperors were, at the time
of the composition of LK, orthodox Christians.

Nonethe-

less, Julian's attempt was no doubt frightening.
The objections to the Incarnation did not rely solely
on the premise of the evilness of the bodily dimension of
human nature.

Another major objection relied on the notion

that God's power should not need an incarnation in order to
accomplish the intended salvation:

•

Why did he [God) take a tedious, circuitous route,
submit to a bodily nature [ ••• ]? Could he not have
remained in his transcendent and divine glory, and
saved man by a command, renouncing such circuitous
routes? (15:291)
Gregory met this objection with the notion of the devil's
due, that salvation was effected without violating the
human sinful choice to surrender to the devil.

The devil's

"rights" in the matter were respected by God, who effected
salvation from within the effects of those choices, by
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entering into death (21-26:298-304).
other standard objections are met by Gregory in
standard ways.

Why did God wait so long to save us?

that evil could reach its "highest pitch" (29:307).
not all believe?

So
Why do

Some hold aloof from the gospel "of their

own free choice" (30:309).
Sections 33-40 end the work with a consideration of
the particular rituals by which one enters and lives in the
church, baptism and the Eucharist.

Many of the objections

regarding the reasonableness of the Incarnation recur
regarding the reasonableness of using creaturely rituals as
bearers of salvation.

How can water or bread and wine make

a difference affecting salvation?

Gregory's response

relies on the fidelity of God in Christ to his promises, to
"be present with those who call upon him" (34:313), and the
power of God to use material elements to bri'hg about new
life (34:314).

Gregory brings out the connections between

the incarnation and the sacraments.
The proper manner of taking part in the sacraments is
also dealt with.

One should accept them in their Trinitar-

ian sense (38-39:321-323) lest one commit oneself to a
religion unable to give salvation.

In conclusion, Gregory

stresses that one's life must give evidence of the change
which is offered in baptism.
LK's purpose was, as was pointed out, to help people
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overcome the objections which keep them from entering the
church and enjoying salvation.

The movement of the book is

appropriate to such a purpose; that movement can be
described as a process of concretization, of identifying
and defending the various dimensions which are constitutive
of right minded acceptance of baptism and Christian life.
Immediately following the introduction's statement of the
overall goal, the least tangible though most decisive topic
is dealt with: the Trinitarian character of God as the
presupposition of salvation.

The book concludes with the

most tangible dimension of Christian life: the sensibly
observable sacramental events and the sensibly observable
changes in the Christian's life (or the lack thereof).

The

discussion of these tangible events is not unrelated to the
discussion of the Trinity.

For one of the characteristics

of a right minded baptism (a baptism which aan divinize) is
that the one being baptized is participating in the rite as
an entry into divine life.

For acceptance of baptism in

the name of a Son and Spirit which are acknowledged as
non-divine, would be participation in a rite which, of its
nature, could not divinize.
In between the least and the most tangible topics,
the topic which had tangibility about it and yet is not now
directly tangible is dealt with: the Incarnation.

The

discussion of the Incarnation is clearly also related to
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the discussion of the Trinity and of baptism and Church
life.

For it is baptism into an incarnate one who is

within the Trinity by nature that can divinize.

Without

the Incarnation, knowledge of the Trinity would be fruitless, since the divine life itself would not be present in
a form accessible to us.

Nor would knowledge of the

Trinity and the fact of the Incarnation be of great
importance, apart from the tangible means by which persons
can share in the life of the incarnated one and thereby of
the Trinity.
In sum, LK is exploring and justifying Christian
views regarding the various constitutive elements of human
divinization or salvation.

The work circles from its

general introductory statement regarding salvation to its
final consideration of the particular ways in which
salvation is realized.

•

We will now expand on LK's themes which are pertinent
to determining whether Gregory's criteria for philosophical
error are reasonable.

Salvation as the Purpose of Truth
We may begin by clarifying Gregory's view that the
Christian message is such that one's relation to it serves
as an indicator of the health of one's intellectual
presuppositions.

Why are preconceptions which are opposed
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to acceptance of the Christian message referred to as a
form of disease?

What is so diseased about the polythe-

ist's opposition to God's unity, or the Jew's and heretical
Christian's denial of the consubstantiality of the Logos
and spirit?

Why are these rather abstract matters, about

which Gregory teaches, so terribly important?
The purpose of teaching the truth by those who are
leaders in the Church is that "the Church is enlarged
through the addition of those who are saved" (Ibid., 268).
salvation is at issue, and salvation within the present
status of the world takes the form of life in the Church.
Before we discuss the ecclesial dimension of salvation, we
must clarify Gregory's notion of salvation and its absence.
Salvation, according to Gregory, is a share in the
restorationl of man to the divinization intended2 in
creation.

What does God intend in creation?-

God the Word and Wisdom and Power created human
nature. He was not, indeed, driven by any necessity
to form man; but out of his abundant love he fashioned
and created such a [living) creature. For (neither
should the) light[ •.. ] remain unseen, (n)or [the)
glory unwitnessed, (n)or [his) goodness unenjoyed, [n)or
[ ... ] (should] any[ .•. ] aspect we observe of the divine
nature [ ••• ] lie idle[,] with no one to share or enjoy
it . ( 5 : 2 7 6 ; PG 4 5 , 21 BC)
Human beings are created to enjoy nothing less than God's
own goodness which is infinite and perfect; they are to
enjoy and "participate in the divine goodness." (Ibid.)
Yet all who live in the world are confronted by the

35

non-divine status of our present life.

In many respects

the present state of the world fails to image God:
where is the soul's likeness to God? Where is the
body's freedom from suffering? Where is the
eternal[ness of] life? Man's life is fleeting, subject
to passion, mortal, liable in soul and body to every
type of suffering. (5:277; PG 45, 24B)
The present state of the world is that of an "unnatural
condition"

(Ibid.).

But the present state of life is not

an argument against its origination by God:
The fact that human life is at present in an
unnatural condition is insufficient proof that man was
never created in a state of goodness. [ ..• ] The cause of
our present condition and of our being deprived of our
former preferable state is to be found elsewhere [than
in God]. (Ibid.)
And
It was by a movement of free will that we became
associated with evil. [ ••• ] By this means we fell from
that blessed state we think of as freedom from passion,
and were changed into evil. (8:282)

•

In short

It is the height of shortsightedness to call God
the author of evil because of the body's sufferings,
which are a necessary accompaniment of our fluctuating
nature. (8: 285)
Divinization, in the situation brought about by sin,
takes the form of salvation from the unnatural, fluctuating
condition of the present state of life.

The fullness of

salvation must involve the complete "restoration" of our
nature.

In the midst of our present unnatural condition,

salvation means that we enjoy some share in our "natural"
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condition.

The life of the Church makes such salvation

available.

But our entire makeup conduces to salvation in

many ways.

Even death plays a role in our salvation:

the creator of our vessel, I mean our sentient and
bodily nature, when it became mingled with evil,
dissolved the material [i.e., allowed us to die] which
contained the evil. And then, once it has been freed
from its opposite, he will remold it by the resurrection, and will reconstitute the vessel into its
original beauty. (8:284)
The fullness of salvation, in order to meet the full
problem as has been described, must involve our restoration
to the enjoyment of truth, to life in justice and love, to
liberation from passions (i.e., de-personalizations in
embodiment and affections), and to resurrected immortality.
Gregory presumes that the salvation offered in the
Church's life is a great good.
this life are its beliefs.

Among the great goods of

Thus Gregory is preoccupied
~

with showing that Christian beliefs are credible on the
common ground accepted by his audience, the ground of
reason.

This is the context in which to clarify how the

opinions of the polytheists, non-Trinitarian Christians and
Jews are at odds with the salvation which is available in
the Church.

Gregory does not explicitly attempt to prove

that salvation is only attainable within the Church nor
does he determine precisely what dimension of human health
is excluded by each of the non-Christian opinions.

We may,

nevertheless, suggest the following lines of reasoning as
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approaches to clarifying the sense in which the non-Christian views are diseased.
The polytheistic denial of the origin of all things
in one all good, all powerful God has among its implications the impossibility of any radical overcoming of the
non-divine characteristics of our present world.

A

consistent polytheist will regard the present status of our
world as the whole and final story.

This could (or perhaps

should) lead to a despair or a foolhardy (because doomed)
heroism.
Heretical Christians and Jews accept that God is the
origin of the entire world and is omnipotent.

Thus they

can consistently hope that God can right the wrongs of the
present status of the world.

But their denial of the

divine consubstantiality of the differentiated subsistent
Logos and Pneuma implicitly includes a

denia~

that the

divine reality itself can be shared with others.

For it is

by means of his Logos (and Pneuma) that God relates to us.
But if the closest thing to God which is accessible within
our experience, the Logos, is not of the divine nature,
then God's nature itself is inaccessible to us; we cannot
share in it.

On the other hand, if the Logos is naturally

involved in the divine life, then that life may be shared.
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Furthermore, since Logos is a relational term*
(l:272), the consubstantiality of the Logos means that
divinity itself involves relationships.

If the divine

nature involves relations, then there is nothing about the
divine nature which would make divinization of creatures
impossible.

If one of the natural participants in the

divine relationships can take on our nature without
diminution (without losing its divinity), then it is not
impossible that we who are not divine by nature could share
in the divine life.

The heretical Christian and Jewish

views, however, exclude subsistent relations from the
divine reality.

On such views the divine nature would be

contaminated if it were mixed with other reality or
realities; such a mixing would be unworthy of and impossible for God.

To attribute such to God would be to treat

God as less exalted and transcendent than hQ is and that
would be to deprive God of his due.

We, then, would have

to regard God's transcendence of our world as a transcendence which is necessarily closed to our participation.
Whatever "logos" or "pneuma" from God there may be in our
world, would not literally be divine, and could not mediate
* Gregory's fellow Cappadocian, Gregory of Nazianzus,
treats the hypostases of the Father, Logos, and Pneuma as
neither essences nor actions; rather they are relations
(Third Theological Oration, # 16; Hardy: 171). Neither are
they substances nor attributes of substances (Fifth
Theological Oration, # 6 and 9; Hardy: 197 and 199).
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human deification.
It would be fully in harmony with Gregory's thought
to suggest that such notions of life, and the God implied
in them, are restricted in ways that even we in our present
intellectual state can understand.

Precisely since God

should be given his due, such restrictions ought not be
accepted without compelling reason.

Reason is rather on

the side of rejecting the heretical or Jewish restrictions
and treating God in the Christian fashion as quite capable
of sharing his own life with us, of divinizing us.

Christ's Incarnation and Salvation
Gregory does not leave the discussion of divinization
in the abstract but clarifies the concrete shape taken by
the process:
If you exclude from life the benefits whieh come from
God, you will have no way of recognizing the divine.
It is from the blessings we experience that we recognize our benefactor, since by observing what happens
to us, we deduce ["infer") the nature of Him who is
responsible for it. (15:290; PG 45, 48A)
Or again, "A good purpose [ ... ] cannot be detected in the
abstract" (20:297).

Gregory clarifies the concrete form in

which divinization becomes possible and available:
To whom did it belong to raise him [man] up when he had
fallen, to restore him when he was lost, to lead him
back when he had gone astray? To whom, but to the very
Lord of his nature? For only the one who had originally given him life was both able and fitted to restore
it [even] when it was lost. This is what the revelation
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of the truth teaches us, when we learn that God originally made man, and saved him when he had fallen (S:2S6;
PG 45, 40C; the bracketed word is omitted in Hardy's
translation)
salvation is possible only by the power of one who was
involved in the creation of our nature (1:271-272) and only
by the presence of that power within our nature:
•.• how could our nature be restored [if, while an earthly being was sick, another being, from heaven, had been
united with the divine]. (27:305; PG 45, 72AB; bracketed
words differ from Hardy's translation)
The divinity must be united with every dimension of our
life, including even our death:
For he who eternally exists did not submit to being
born in a body because he was in need of life. Rather
was it to recall us from death to life. Our whole
nature had to be brought back from death.
In consequence he stooped down to our dead body and stretched
out a hand, as i t were, to one who was prostrate.
(32:310)
The point of the incarnation of divinity in our human
nature is that our life as a whole might be

~estored

to the

ideal in which we were created and thereby share in
divinity:
The manner of our salvation owes its efficacy less to
instruction by teaching than to what He who entered
into fellowship with man actually did.
[He actualized
life in deed], so that by means of the flesh which
he assumed and thereby deified salvation might come
to all that was [of the same kind]. (35:314, PG 45,
SSA; bracketed words differ from Hardy's translation)
This incarnation can be recognized when it occurs by
the character of the deeds which the Incarnate One performs:
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It is a mark of God to give man life; to preserve
by his providence all existing things; to afford food
and drink to those who have been granted life in the
flesh; to care for those in want; by health to restore
to itself the nature perverted by sickness; to exercise
an equal sway over all creation [ ... ], and above all to
be the vanquisher of death and corruption.
If, then,
the record ["histories," i.e., the Scriptures) about him
[Jesus, the purported incarnate Logos) were defective
in any of these or suchlike things, unbelievers would
have good reason to take exception to our religion.
But
if everything by which we know God is evident in the
record ["what we are told"] about him, what stands in
the way of believing? (12:289; PG 45, 44D-45A)
The incarnation of the divine Logos makes nothing
less than salvation possible.

Polytheists and even

heretical Christians may well admire Jesus as an "intermediary" divine being, one who greatly exceeds mere human
nature without being of the substance of the ultimate God.
We may know of Jews who regard Jesus as a prophet or an
esteemed rabbi.

Gregory points out that regarding Jesus as

less than one in nature with God cannot lead to the fruit

•

of salvation.

This can be seen in Gregory's treatment of

the character of Jesus which justifies acceptance of
baptism in his name:
If, then, man is a created being and he thinks of
the Spirit and the only-begotten God as similarly
created, he would be foolish to hope for a change for
the better [by accepting baptism in them and thus
communion with them], when he is only reverting to his
own nature.
[ •.. ] if a man does not ally himself with
the uncreated nature, but with the creation which is
akin to him and shares his bondage, his is not the
birth from above.
But the gospel says [Cf. John 3:3)
that the birth of those who are saved is from above.
(39:323)
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If one of the uncreated nature itself is not incarnate,
then we are not saved.

One who denies the possibility of

such incarnation, either by holding that no Logos which is
accessible to us can be subsistent within God or by holding
that a subsistent Logos within God cannot be united with
our nature, denies the possibility of salvation.

Eaith as the Attitude of Salvation
Gregory's view of the nature of and need for faith,
though treated only in passing in LK, is essential for our
understanding of the diseased character of the non-Christian opinions.

We may well wonder why possession of the

false opinions of Jews, polytheists and heretical Christians, even about important issues, wounds one's enjoyment
of life?

What practical difference is there?

Crucial to

an answer is Gregory's notion of God's respeet for our
freedom; God does not coerce us into sharing his life.
Human freedom and intellect are involved in divinization in
the form of faith.

Divinization does not occur apart from

human faith.
The incarnation and our knowledge of it in faith
makes a difference because human beings are the sort of
things which are designed to cooperate in an active way in
the realization of God's creative generosity:
If, then, man came into being for these reasons,
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viz., to participate in the divine goodness, he had to
be fashioned in such a way as to fit him to share in
this goodness. For just as the eye shares in light
through having by nature an inherent brightness in it,
and by this innate power attracts what is akin to
itself, so something akin to the divine had to be
mingled with human nature.
In this way its desire [for
divine goodness] would correspond to something native
to it. ( 5: 2 7 6)
And furthermore, that which
is in every respect made similar to the divine, must
certainly possess free will and liberty by nature, so
that participation in the good may be the reward of
virtue. (5:277)
Not even divinization occurs in human beings against their
knowledge and will.

The human powers of understanding and

free choice operate not only with reference to the material
things of the world; they are even pertinent to the
spiritual life:
(all the other living creatures] owe their existence to
the impulse of their parents; but spiritual birth is in
the control of the one born. Since, then, everyone has
a choice in this matter and there is a danger of acting
unwisely, it is well, I think, for one initiating his
own (spiritual] birth to think out in advance whom it
is well to have as a father and from what it is best
that his nature should consist. For, as I have said,
in such a birth one is free to choose one's own parents.
(39:321; PG 45, 970-lOOA)
Man's attitude is decisive for his salvation or
fallenness.

Any attitude which is devoted to creatures

rather than the creator is self-dooming.

By definition it

involves a restriction in the goodness which can possibly
be enjoyed.

A priori it is closed to divinization,

immortality, and freedom from passions.
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.Among the attitudes which are hopeless (literally in
the final analysis) is that which takes as real and good
onlY that which can be sensed or intellectually comprehendHuman knowing, according to Gregory, always involves

ed .

both sensory and intellectual aspects.

Nevertheless,

sensation and intellection are very different; since God is
by nature non-material, he can only be known about and
known intellectually.

But human sensation and intellection

have in common that they are equally created powers.

Our

intellection is no more a positive instrument by which to
construct or comprehend divine reality than is our sensation.

Our cognitional power is adequate to divine reality

in only one sense; it suffices for us to accept and enjoy
an unceasingly deepening participation in the divine life
(5:276).

The attitude which is hopeful (i.e., wnich hopes for
and accepts its fulfillment by the saving, divinizing
incarnation) is the only attitude in which divinization is
actually able to be enjoyed.

It is the intellectual and

volitional willingness to accept communion in the revelation which comes from divinity and which is divine in
substance.

This is the attitude known as faith, without

which there is no salvation:
we have thought it well to limit ourselves to what the
gospel has to say about faith, viz., that he who is
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born by spiritual rebirth recognizes[*] by whom he is
born, and what kind of creature he becomes. For this
is the only kind of birth where we can choose what we
are to become. (38:321)
It must be stressed that, according to Gregory, faith
is not an abdication of intellect.

In truth, it is the

roost fully developed, open-minded exercise of intellect
possible.#
Nor is faith merely an intellectual affair.
involves one's will as well.

Faith

Far from involving an

abdication of one's capacity for willing, faith realizes
the highest, most "will-full" case of willing possible; it
culminates in love.
The character of faith can be clarified by contrasting it with lower ways of using intellect and, by extension, will.

Creaturely powers, even of beings higher than

human, are not divine by nature.

Our intellect, by its own

•

power, can produce concepts regarding those dimensions of
reality which are comprehensible to us.

If the divine were

"accessible" (27:305) as the object at the end of our
* Danielou, 35, quotes from Gregory's Against Eunomius: "there is no other way of drawing near to God than by
the intermediary of faith; it is only through faith that
the questing soul can unite itself with the incomprehensible Godhead."
# Danielou, 31, quotes from Gregory's Commentary on
the Canticle of Canticles: "when I gave up every finite
mode of comprehension, then it was that I found my Beloved
by faith."
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productive intellectual development, God would not be
radically transcendent to us; he would be much higher than
us, but the difference would be measureable.

God would be

more accessible to the more spiritually developed or more
purely spiritual elements in creation.

We could achieve a

sort of divinization by strenuous and pure intellectual
activity, while jettisoning our less spiritual, bodily
dimension.
But this "productive" knowledge of the comprehensible
dimensions of reality does not saves us in our bodilyspiritual integrity.
divinization.

Nor is it sufficient to effect

The realities grasped in such knowledge are

inherently creaturely and do not even exhaust the concrete
reality of creatures.

Such knowledge does not actualize

the full potentialities of our intellectual and volitional
powers.

Nor is any knowledge which can be achieved by

intellectual creatures higher than human, adequate to God.
That which is accessible to creaturely intellectual powers
is not God, since God,
by reason of his transcendent nature, is unapproachable.
[ ..• ] For what is totally inaccessible is not accessible
to one thing and inaccessible to another. [ ... ]
The true way[ ... ] of regarding the transcendent
dignity does not have in view comparisons in terms of
"lower" and "higher." (27:305-306)
Faith is the highest actualization, by God's grace,
of our creaturely powers of intellection and volition.

But
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it is a form of reception rather than an attempt to
approach the "unapproachable" under our own power.3

Our

intellect and will are perfected only in accepting the
self-presenting approach of the unapproachable in the
incarnate Logos.

The incarnate Logos is the "object" for

which the attitude of faith is the receptive capacity.

It

is for faithful acceptance of the Logos that the powers of
intellect and will are created.

The incomprehensibility of

the object of faith does not mean that it is unknowable.
Rather, the incarnate Logos exceeds that which created
intellect can produce, duplicate, or approach by its own
power.4

As inherently "excessive," it is the type of

object by which divinization is possible.

The incarnate

presence of the incomprehensible divine nature (that
presence as mediated by ecclesial realities) releases our
powers into unceasing change for the good.5 •There is no
good reason for the intellect to settle for less* (i.e. for
any creature or, even less, for the comprehensible dimensions of creatures).

There is no good reason for the

intellect to refuse faith and faith's flower, love.
This should allow us to understand why the false
assumptions of the polytheists and heretical Christians are
* Danielou, 52, includes a quote from Gregory's On
Perfection: " ••. perfection consists in our never stopping
in our growth in good, never circumscribing our perfection
by any limitation."
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of such concern to Gregory.

The salvation and divinization

of these people, for which God creates them, are at stake.
They cannot enjoy that participation in the divine life
while their attitudes are trapped in assumptions which shut
out the possibility of accepting the incarnation.
minds are self-thwarting.

Their

This is the disease for which

Gregory is prescribing the cure of solid teaching.

The

ecclesial context of solid teaching is our next topic.

The sacramental/Ecclesial Dimension
Gregory presents the sacraments as ways by which
Jesus' promise "always to be present" with us (34:313) is
fulfilled.

The spread of salvation made possible by the

incarnation of the divine Word takes the concrete form, as
was mentioned earlier, of the enlargement of the Church.*
The Church is the community which mediates t~e divinization
brought by the incarnate Logos.

Entry into the Church, and

thereby into the milieu of divinization, occurs in the
right-minded acceptance (acceptance in faith) of baptism
and the eucharist.

Gregory speaks of baptism, to which

catechetical instruction is oriented, as a passage to life:
For the mortal creature to pass to life, another
* LK was written c. 383, i.e., in the midst of the
mass conversions of intelligent Hellenists to Christianity
which began with the legitimation of Christianity by
Constantine and accelerated following the death of Julian.
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birth had to be devised, since the first birth led only
to a mortal existence. This second birth could neither
begin nor end in corruption, but had to bring the one
who was born to immortal life. (33:312)
The Eucharist too works for divinization:
Owing to man's twofold nature, composed as it is
of soul and body, those who come to salvation must be
united with the Author of their life by means of both.
[ ... ] Now only that body in which God dwelt,
acquired such life-giving grace; [ .•. ] our body cannot
become immortal unless it shares in immortality by its
association with what is immortal.
[ ... ]He [God] unites himself with their [believers] bodies so that mankind too, by its union with what
is immortal, may share in incorruptibility. And this he
confers on us by the power of the blessing [i.e., the
Eucharistic prayer], through which he changes the nature
of the visible elements into that immortal body.
(37:318-319)
The role of baptism and the eucharist in the process
of divinization is associated with the importance of
openness to the truth of the Christian message; openness to
that message is openness to baptism and the Eucharist and
thereby to salvation.

•

Thus, presuppositions which obstruct

one's acceptance of the Christian message are forms of
disease.

Such underlying ideas prevent one from enjoying

salvation; they indirectly contribute to the hold of
corruption upon one's life.

A discussion which helps one

overcome such salvation-thwarting presuppositions thereby
helps one prepare for baptism.

Baptism and the eucharist

do not make sense if they are accepted apart from faith,
i.e., apart from a sincere mind and heart; every sincere
recipient should begin to show in her own life the nature
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of divinized life offered by and celebrated in the ritual:
if the washing has only affected the body, and the soul
has failed to wash off the stains of passion, and the
life after initiation is identical with that before,
despite the boldness of my assertion I will say without
shrinking that in such a case the water is only water,
and the gift of the Holy Spirit is nowhere evident in
the action. (40:324)
This need determines the character of the catechetical instructions which prepare for baptism.

Such instruc-

tions must meet a person where she is at and help her
overcome her own particular obstacles to divinized life.
Just as any medical therapy should be adapted to the
particular disease it is designed to heal, so must Christian teaching be adapted to the particular intellectual
disease it is meant to overcome:
For we must adapt our method of therapy to the form of
the disease. You will not heal the polytheism of the
Greek in the same way as the Jew's disbelief about the
only-begotten God. Nor, in the case of tJlose astray
in heresy, will you refute their erroneous doctrinal
inventions all in the same way.
[ ••. ] we must have in
view men's preconceptions and address ourselves to the
error in which each is involved. (Introduction, 268-269)
The intellectual component of catechetical discourse should
help the person to become aware of preconceptions or
underlying ideas which stifle the fullness of her life.
The entirety of Gregory's LK is oriented toward helping the
people with whom Gregory regularly dealt approach baptism
and life in the Church properly.

It is not a systematic

treatise aimed at the discovery of truth for its own sake.
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Whereas some forms of abstract philosophical truth may well
be presented to a student as independent of the intellectual situation or preconceptions of that student, Gregory's
approach seems to imply that Christian truth cannot be so
presented.

There is an appropriate pluralism within the

Christian message:
The same method of teaching, however, is not suitable
for everyone who approaches this word [the Christian
message as rightly handed on in the Church]. Rather
must we adapt religious instruction to the diversities
of religion. While we keep in view the same objective
in our teaching, we cannot use the same arguments in
each case. (Ibid., 268)
The essentially reasonable character of communion in
the Church's life, as pointed out above, does not imply
that the truth of the Christian message may be humanly
comprehended or should be rationally proved.

The truth

which characterizes rational communion is the divine truth
of "the mystery of our religion."

•

The mystery of our

religion harmonizes with our reason by restoring it to its
integral state and opening it, as faith, to the full range
of truth.

But this mystery exceeds what could be enjoyed

by any intentional effort of thinking.

Danielou writes:

In the treatise Against Eunomius he [Gregory] insists
that the "strength of Christianity" consists not in
philosophical speculation but in the "power of regeneration by faith" and in the "participation in mystical
symbols and rites." (18)
That truth to which we are opened is God's incomprehensible
life itself; the mysteries of the faith make available for
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us the incomprehensible, thus ever more sharable, fullness
of divine life.

our rationality is most properly under-

stood as a condition for the possibility of this mystery of
our divinization, the mystery of God's abundant sharing.
catechetical teaching which is true to its own character
will employ reasonable argumentation only to show some
un-divine, constricting assumption for what it is.

There

will be no pretense that that mystery can be rationally
proved which can be enjoyed only by sharing in the tradition of the mystery.
In sum, the catechetical character of LK is quite
appropriate for one whose sense of truth is that of a
constitutive element of the enjoyment of communion, even
and especially communion in God's life, as well a means for
the conversion necessary for that communion.
which is needed is that which opens one to

The truth

a fullness

of

life (divinization) from which one is otherwise closed by
false opinions.

Nor is truth restricted to the instru-

mental role of overcoming obstacles to fullness of life
(divinization); truth is also one component of that
divinized life itself.

Truth itself involves at least a

hint of the presence of God, and all creatures as originated by God, in their proper incomprehensibility.
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conclusion
We have focused upon Gregory's own conception of the
role of LK and of the connections among its main themes and
its approach.

The overall context is that of the diviniza-

tion (and overcoming of corruption, especially intellectual
corruption) which God is accomplishing through Christ; in
the Church, and especially by means of her catechetical
teachers.

Error, in this context, is the intellectual form

taken by corruption.

All basic or philosophical error is

somehow closed to faith.
of reason.

Faith itself is the fulfillment

Therefore, that which is opposed to faith will

be, in some way, opposed also to reason.

On this ground we

may surmise that Gregory does have or could have reasonable
criteria for discerning philosophical error.
With this overview of LK in mind, we can proceed to
our characterization of the dynamism of Gregory's thought
by means of his choice of foils.

We will thereby determine

more definitely whether he has consistent criteria by which
he recognizes error and by which he strives to explicate
truth or whether his rejections are rationally arbitrary.
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NOTES
1. Whether "restoration" is an adequate portrayal of
the process which takes place by means of the incarnation
is subject to debate; see Balas, 151: "If [ ..• ] one realizes that Gregory conceived the beginning of human history
(i.e. man before the Fall) not as a static state of
perfection, but as a starting point for spiritual growth,
then it will appear very questionable to attribute to him a
conception of salvation history which would accomplish
nothing but the restoration of that perfect state."
2. Danielou, 14: "in man created in God's image he
[Gregory] sees the preexistence of human nature in the
perfection of the divine knowledge--such as it will be
only at the end of time." Thus Danielou suggests that
Gregory need not be read as holding that man ever actually
enjoyed the state to which salvation "restores" him.
3. Harvanek (49 and 69-72) treats the limits of
epinoia (our "productive" function of intellect) and the
transcendence of those limits by means of God's revelation
and in mysticism. He discusses these topics in terms of
Gregory's differences with the rationalism of Greek
philosophers and Christian heretics.
4. Hence Gregory explains in other works that the
mystical flowering of faith is experienced as a darkness,
cf. Danielou, 23-42 or Cambridge, 455.

•

5. Danielou, 47-55, discusses the originality of
Gregory's notion of change as a positive reality.
The importance of the sacraments and Church life for
the possibilility of fruitful change is not discussed in
depth in the secondary literature. Danielou, 18-23,
mentions the necessity of the sacraments. Harvanek, 47-49,
discusses Gregory's view that without the discipline of a
Christologically derived teaching, such as is present in
the Scriptures or the Church's teaching, our intellectual
powers would be trapped in a mode of "free" exercise which
could never make definite progress in truth (cf. Danielou,
48-51, regarding the fruitless type of change).

CHAPTER III
Gregory's Philosophical Foils

By means of the method of "contrastive projection",
we will now show the orientation of Gregory's thought or
show whether it has any rationally consistent orientation.
our assumption is that a thinker's basic orientation is
revealed more definitely by his philosophical foils, those
positions against which he expends intellectual energy,
than by his positive statements, which may or may not be
the fruits of sufficient reflection.

Furthermore, Greg-

ory's culture was rhetorical in character, continuity in
expression rather than creativity was the rule.

This

implies that Gregory will phrase his questions and answers
in terms of the commonplaces of his audience.

This will be

done in spite of any recognition Gregory may have had of a
possible inappropriateness of such terms for a positive
expression of his own thought.

He was not primarily

attempting to work out a systematic theology: he was
attempting to meet the needs of his audience.

We will thus

use his choice of foils, rather than any expressions of his
positive reflective theological views (which have been
treated to some degree in the preceding chapter), as the
surest way to uncover the basic commitments of his own
55
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thought, if there are any.
In this chapter, we will list and group the more
important of Gregory's philosophical foils in LK.

The next

chapter will proceed from the list and grouping to characterize the rationally unified, consistent set of criteria,
if there be such, in accord with which he rejects those
views which he finds false.

If any position later recog-

nized as an essential component of orthodoxy is found among
Gregory's foils, we will know that his basic orientation is
against Christian orthodoxy.

On the other hand, if no such

anomaly is found, then no number of suspect positive statements or inadequate hypotheses could suffice to demonstrate
a non-Christian character to his thinking.

Our method of

contrastive projection will not yield a thoroughgoing
account of Gregory's thought, but such is not the purpose
of this portion of our work.

Our work as a•whole will

succeed if it determines with high surety the character of
the philosophy toward which his thought strives.

Our study

of his chosen foils will, hopefully, display his thinking's
effective commitments with a distinctness that justifies
our treatment of an already well-studied topic.
The most important foils in LK may be divided into
four groups. Gregory attacks various forms of "ontological
reductionism," 1) any view which attributes a deficiency or
limitation, especially of goodness, to the nature of God or
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2) which denies a divine image to man's nature.

3) He then

argues against any view which treats evil as a positive
reality.

4) Gregory attacks "epistemological reductionism"

or any view which treats sensation or any limited frame of
mind as if its objective correlate were the fullness of
reality.

We will now consider these foils in turn.

"Degrading God's Nature"

lJS is preoccupied with demonstrating that Christian
beliefs do not "degrade God's nature" by attributing to it
anything unworthy, e.g., any limitation characteristic of
non-divine, finite natures:
In reference, however, to the transcendent nature,
everything said of it is raised to a higher degree by
virtue of the greatness of the object. (1:270, see also
271, 272, 2:273)
The divine nature, not our own, must be treated as the

•

fullness of perfection: man
is the image of the divine nature; and an image would
be entirely identical with what it resembled, were it
not in some way different from it. (21:297, see also
35:316-7)
Gregory treats any suggestion of a limitation to the divine
goodness as a horrible falsity.

The divine can not involve

any imperfection (Introduction:269, thus there can not be a
plurality of gods).

Nor could God possess any perfection

perfectly unless he possessed all perfectly (20:296-7).
Gregory's attack upon any such degradation of the divine
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nature takes many forms.

We will consider the most

important.
1.1. If no perfection can be lacking to the divine
nature, then a fortiori no evil (9:287, 15:291-2), nor any
inclination toward evil (1:271), nor any origination of
evil (5:277-8, 7:282, 30:308-9) can be attributed to God.
1.2. Might the divine nature lack logos or reason in
a subsistent form?

Gregory rails against such a proposal

because it would imply that divinity is inferior to human
beings who do enjoy such reason (1:270-2).

God's Logos

must be even more, not less, subsistent than our own.
Since God's Logos exceeds our own, even infinitely, we are
not in a position to find divine actions wanting in reason
(17:294-5).

Our reasoning about divine matters should be

exercised with humility.

This humility is perhaps lacking

in those whose Stoic assumptions lead to rnterpretations of
the lateness in history of the Christian salvific events as
a demonstration of the inefficiency and improvidence of the
Christian God (15:291, 17:294-296).
Likewise Gregory fights the notion that God's Logos
could lack pneuma or spirit (2:272-3) when even humans have
spirit.

The divine Spirit could not be less subsistent

than our own.
1.3. Isn't the divine nature susceptible of change?
Gregory explains why this cannot be the case.

Change is
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characteristic of creatures:
everything that depends upon creation for its existence
has an innate tendency to change. For the very existence of creation had its origin in change, non-being
becoming being by divine power. (6:280, see also
21:297-298 and 39:321-322)
But God, by definition, has not begun to be from a "prior"
state of non-being.

Thus there is no reason to attribute

mutability, a characteristic of creatures, to divinity.
1.4. The import of Gregory's attack on a conception
of the divine nature as mutable is clarified by his
treatment of the question of whether weakness, [pathos]
could characterize the divinity.

He draws a distinction.

He stresses that weakness, in the sense of a susceptibility
to losing some dimension of goodness which one has, is not
attributable to divinity.

God cannot change from his

perfection in goodness:
With what, then, does our religion contelld the divine
came into contact? Was it weakness in its strict
sense, that is, evil, or was it the changing movement
of nature? Were our teaching to affirm that the divine
entered a state which is morally forbidden, it would be
our duty to avoid such a preposterous doctrine, implying, as it does, an unsound view of the divine nature.
But if we affirm that he had contact with our nature,
which derived its original being and subsistence from
him, in what way does the gospel proclamation fail to
have a fitting conception of God? In our faith we
introduce no element of weakness in our ideas of God.
For we do not say that a doctor incurs weakness when he
heals someone in a state of weakness. Even though he
comes into contact with sickness, the doctor remains
free from such weakness. (16:292-293)
It would seem to follow that a type of weakness or of
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change which does not compromise the perfection of divinity
necessari~y

is not

opposed to divinity.

This type of

change, as will be shown soon, is one of the ways in which
God's unchangeable goodness is realized.
1.5. Gregory himself points out how fitting it is
that God exercises benevolence toward us:
[for neither should the] light [ •.• ] remain unseen,
[n]or [the] glory unwitnessed, [n]or [his] goodness
unenjoyed, [n]or [ ..• ] [should] any[ ... ] aspect we
observe of the divine nature [ •.. ] lie idle[,] with no
one to share or enjoy it. (5:276; PG 45, 21C)
He is very clear that the appropriateness of God's benevolence to us is not entailed by some necessity in the divine
nature.

Gregory does not treat necessitarian interpreta-

tions of the relation between God and creation at any great
length, but he clearly rules out any such view:
he who is God the Word and Wisdom and Power created
human nature. He was not, indeed, driven by any
necessity to form man; but out of his ab~ndant love
he fashioned and created such a creature. (5:276)
1.6. Gregory rules out suggestions that God lacks
benevolence for his creatures.

This is shown especially in

God's ability, as just discussed, to bring good even out of
the evil choices of his creatures:
Which, then, was better? Not to have brought our nature
into being at all, since he knew in advance that the one
to be created would stray from the good? Or, having
brought him into being, to restore him by repentance,
sick as he was, to his original grace? (8:285, see also
7:282, 12:289 for a list of God's bounties, 15:290-1,
20:297, and 26:303-304 that even the devil is profited)
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1.7. can God be acknowledged as perfectly good but

ineffectual, as some human beings are?

Gregory rules this

out since it implicitly denies the perfection of any of
God's perfections.

God's power must extend to restoring

those goods which were lost by creaturely sins:
only the one who had originally given him [sinning man]
life was both able and fitted to restore it when it was
lost. (8:286)
This power for goodness is incapable of only one sort of
activity, evil activity; thus God can exercise his goodness
in any good way and in any good area of reality; for God
did not allow the fickleness of man's will to influence
his own immutable nature with its constant purpose of
goodness? [ ..• ] But the goodness of his intention would
have availed nothing had not wisdom made his love of
man effective. (20:297)
[ .•• ] If, then, the diseased member was on earth,
and the divine power, to preserve its own dignity, did
not come into contact with it, its concern with creatures with which we have nothing in common would not
have benefited man. (27:305)

•

God's power is shown when he takes to himself that which he
is not by nature as a means of healing sinners:
that the omnipotent nature was capable of descending to
man's lowly position is a clearer evidence of power
than great and supernatural miracles.
[ .•• God's is]
a power which is not bounded by circumstances contrary
to its nature.
[ ... ]His power is clear in this: that he came in
the likeness of man and in the lowly form of our nature.
(24:300-301)
1.8. This brings us to the foil which recurs most
frequently in LK and in all the polemic literature about
Christianity in its early centuries (and later as well):
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the divinity can not share properties of our nature; the
purported Christian "incarnation" is impossible.

Gregory

took such challenges to the incarnation seriously:
were our teaching to affirm that the divine entered a
state which is morally forbidden, it would be our duty
to avoid such a preposterous doctrine, implying, as it
does, an unsound view of the divine nature. (16:292)
He defends the possibility of the incarnation of the divine
Logos in Christ in two major steps: 1) he shows that each
purported case of impossibility involves a false attribution of evil to something which is not evil; and 2) he
shows the compatibility of the incarnation with God's
perfect goodness.

We have already considered this second

step in points 1.4-6 above.

Now we must consider the

various particular cases in which Gregory responds to the
challenge to the incarnation with his own challenge:
Now everything we see included in the good is
fitting to God.
In consequence, either our opponents
must show that the birth, the upbringing, the growth,
the natural advance to maturity, the experience of
death and the return from it are evil. Or else, if
they concede that these things fall outside the category of evil, they must of necessity acknowledge there
is nothing shameful in what is alien to evil. (9:287)
The most difficult challenges are posed by birth and
death.

Does then the birth of the incarnate one involve

divinity in evil?

In Gregory's time the birth of a

incarnate divine being could have implied that God had
engaged in sexual relations with the mother of the incarnate one.

Such a view would involve the attribution of
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sexual activity to God.

Sexual activity, as "sensual

pleasure", was regarded as involved in evil:
It is the sensual pleasure which precedes human birth
that is weakness, and it is the impulse to evil in
living beings that is the sickness of our nature.
(16:293, see also 13:289)
Thus birth usually has its origin in an activity which
involves "weakness" in the strictly proper sense of "what
affects the will and perverts it toward evil and away from
virtue" (16:292).

Is the character of the sexual activity

which precedes birth enough to show the impropriety of the
Christian claim that the incarnate one was born?

Gregory

points out that:
our religion teaches that God was incarnate in man,
not that he entered a state of evil. There is only
one way for a man to enter life, viz., to be begotten
and brought into existence. Now our opponents [ •.• ]
fail to realize that the whole anatomy of the body is
uniformly to be valued, and that no factor which contributes to the maintenance of life can be charged with
being dishonorable or evil.
[ .•• ]by the generative
organs the immortality of the human race is preserved,
and death's perpetual moves against us are, in a way,
rendered futile and ineffectual.
[ .•• ]What unfitting
notion, then, does our religion contain, if God was
united with human life by the very means by which our
nature wars on death? (28:306-307)
Sexual activity as such, then, is not inherently evil,
although in our present state of life it may usually
involve "weakness" in the strict sense.

Furthermore

Man begins his existence in weakness and similarly ends
his life through weakness.
But in God's case, the birth
did not have its origin in weakness, neither did the
death end in weakness.
For sensual pleasure did not
precede the birth. (13:289)
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of course, the gospel teaches that the conception and birth
of the incarnate occurred not only without sexual activity
motivated by "weakness", but without any sexual activity.
such a birth was free from evil:
If birth in itself is not weakness, one cannot
call life weakness. It is the sensual pleasure which
precedes human birth that is weakness, and it is the
impulse to evil in living beings that is the sickness
of our nature. But our religion claims He was pure
from both of these.
If, then, his birth was free from
sensual plesure and his life from wickedness, what
weakness remains for God to have shared in, according
to our devout religion? (16:293)
His birth was beyond natural powers:
while he was born, he transcended our nature[ ... ] in
manner of birth[ .•. ]. It would be consistent for you
to refuse to think of him as a mere man[ ... ]. (13:290)
Even if it is granted that birth is not incompatible
with divinity, "the birth makes the death necessary"
(32:309).

Is death itself compatible with divinity?

Surely God is most fully alive?

Mortality as such must not

be evil if it is to be compatible with divinity.
came death to us and for what purpose?

Whence

Death

is the characteristic mark of irrational nature; and in
His care for man, He who heals our wickedness subsequently provided him with the capacity to die, but not
to die permanently. (8:283)
Though death can terrify one who judges matters from the
viewpoint of pleasures and pains (8:282), Gregory points
out that it will be grasped by the one who loves reason as
a means for separating our good natures from their evil
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accretions.

Thus death itself is not evil; it is not

therefore incompatible with divinity.

There is nothing

contradictory when:
We hold that God was involved in both these
changes of our nature, by which the soul is united to
the body and separated from it. (16:293)
As stated above, the weakness [pathos] which characterizes
our lives is, strictly speaking, only "what affects the
will and perverts it toward evil" (16:292).

An incarnation

of the divine Logos in such weakness is impossible.

But

this does not show the impossibility of an incarnation of
divinity into the human network of mutual dependence.
Death is an element of that human network of mutual
connectedness.

As there is nothing inherently evil in the

latter, there is no reason to deny the incarnation, with
the death it involved, on such a count.
Even prudent, benevolent trickery is ftot incompatible
with incarnate divinity, since in the "angle and bait"
theme, God
made use of a deceitful device [the incarnation's
concealment of divinity from the devil] to save the one
who had been ruined. (26:303)
In short, since
our human life [ ... ] from beginning to end and throughout was stained with sin.
[ ... ] the power which amends
our nature had to reach to both points.
[ ... ]the
beginning and [ ... ]the end, covering all that lies
between. (27:304)
The incarnation meets the problem where it is: in the
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totality of human life including death (32:310).

The

objection of reason would be to a purported divinity which
sought to meet the problem with inadequate or irrelevant
means, rather than to the Christian notion of incarnation.
1.9. Gregory, having established the non-impossibility of an incarnation, treats related objections.
God lose his divinity by a union with humanity?

Wouldn't
For

example, would not an incarnate divinity be bodily circumscribed?

Gregory retorts that even human beings are not

bodily circumscribed (10:287-8).

Furthermore, Jesus' deeds

cannot be accounted for by natural human powers (13:289-90,
32:310).

Divine apatheia is not lost but manifested by

taking on the weakness [pathos] and changes which are
proper to our good nature in its present state:
In our faith we introduce no element of weakness in
our ideas of God. For we do not say that a doctor
incurs weakness when he heals someone in.a state of
weakness. Even though he comes into contact with
sickness, the doctor remains free from such
weakness. (16:292-3)
1.10. A final foil for Gregory is the view that the
transcendent God is less distant from the heavens and
purely spiritual beings than from our human nature.
Gregory points out that God is infinitely beyond any
created nature:
what is totally inaccessible [save by
faith] is not accessible to one thing
to another. Rather does it transcend
things in equal degree. Earth is not

revelation to
and inaccessible
all existing
more below his
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dignity, and heaven less.
[ ... ]Otherwise we could not
conceive of the power that governs the universe as
equally pervading all things.
[ .•• ] from these differences of more and less, the divine nature would appear
to be composite [ •.. ]. (27:305)
The transcendence of God in relation to all creatures is
implied in the notion of God as perfectly good and not
merely sharing in goodness.
In sum, any notion which detracts from God's perfection, including his power regarding that which he is not by
nature, is attacked by Gregory as irrational.

Degrading Human Nature
The next set of foils in LK concerns human nature.
Gregory opposes the attribution of any limitations to man's
nature which would imply that our creator is other than God
(8:285, 28:306) or that God has destined us to be less than
his images or to enjoy less than a participation in the
divine life (5:276-77, 6:279, 21:297) or to be incapable of
revealing or transmitting divinity (32:310, 33-34:313-4,
36:318, 37:320 on the world's "eucharistic-ability").

In

short, human nature is thoroughly good (9:287, 15:292).
2.1. Could human beings naturally lack immortality?
Gregory opposes this since it would imply that we lacked
that kinship with the divine by which we could come "to
enjoy God's goodness" (5:276).
2.2. Could human beings naturally lack free will,
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especially regarding the state of their spiritual life
(and, in effect, rebirth)?

Gregory responds that

were human life governed by necessity, the "image" [of
God] would be falsified in that respect and so differ
from the archetype. For how can a nature subject to
necessity and in servitude be called an image of the
sovereign nature? What, therefore, is in every respect
made similar to the divine, must certainly possess free
will and liberty by nature, so that participation in
the good may be the reward of virtue. (5:277)
The decisions of creaturely free will are respected even by
God (22:298-9).

Without free will's cooperation, baptism

is useless (40:324, see also 38-39:321).
2.3. Could human beings be satisfied by a total
release from embodiment, such that we would not be constrained by the limits of bodily life?

Gregory refuses to

grant that human life is in need of an elimination of its
embodiment as such.

He grants that the present state of

our embodiment leaves much to be desired.

But we could not

•

be satisfied until "our sentient and bodily nature" is
"freed from its opposite [evils from sin]"; "he [God] will
remold it by the resurrection, and will reconstitute the
vessel into its original beauty" (8:284).

God

does not prevent the soul's separation from the body by
death in accordance with the inevitable course of
nature. But he brings them together again by the
resurrection. Thus he becomes the meeting point of both,
of death and of life. In himself he restores the nature
which death has disrupted, and becomes himself the
principle whereby the separated parts are reunited.
(16:294)
2.4. But wouldn't it be a great deficiency on man's
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part if he could not save himself?

Gregory acknowledges

that man is, by his own consent, trapped in evil:
it was not possible for him to be discreet, once he had
turned from discretion, or to form any wise decision
once he had departed from wisdom. (8:286)
By his own power man cannot escape from the "labyrinth"
(35:315) of death.

It would be a great shortcoming in

God's creative accomplishment if there were no other way by
which man could come to enjoy his share in God's life.

Of

course, as already treated, by the incarnation God can
restore man to that from which man turned.

Thus by means

of baptism, man's spirit can be restored (5:317).

Man can

receive bodily restoration toward immortality by the divine
remedy of the eucharistic body of the immortal one (37:318).

By faith in God, the immortal one and source of any

share in immortality, man is not lacking in the "means" by
which to enjoy the immortality lost by sin: •
Of what, then, will one who considers his own interest
carefully choose to be the child: of a nature observed
to be mutable or of one which is unchanging and stable
and consistently good? (39:322)
In short, many thinkers view human reality as
incapable of receiving and enjoying a share in the divine
life.

Many hold that man's nature does not image divine

reality since it is manifest that man's present state is
pervaded by evil.

These views are rejected by Gregory.
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Identifying Any Natural Reality with Evil
Another of Gregory's prominent themes is the polemic
against those who degrade any natural reality (9:287) by
identifying it as evil.
3.1. Must not anyone with intellectual honesty admit
that the natural workings of our world and its arrangement
are fatally (literally, oriented toward death) flawed?
Gregory regards such a view as specious (1:271).

He holds

that every natural aspect of the world can share in the
immortality involved in divine fellowship.

He specifies

how humanity allows the entirety of the world's nature to
share divinization.

God's purpose is that:

no part fails to share in the divine fellowship.
On this account the divine nature produces in
man a blending of the intelligible and the sensible.
(6:279, see also 37:318)
3.2. But does not change always involve a loss of
possessed goodness?
evil?

•

Surely change necessarily partakes of

Gregory challenges this and holds that only one type

of changes, sinful changes, are inherently evil.

Change

itself is a characteristic of all created natures as they
come from their creator.

Thus it can be for the better:

Now that alone is unchangeable by nature which
does not originate through creation. But whatever is
derived from the uncreated nature has its subsistence
out of nonbeing. Once it has come into being through
change, it constantly proceeds to change. If it acts
according to its nature, this continual change is for
the better. But if it is diverted from the straight
path, there succeeds a movement in the opposite
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direction.

(8:286)

Nor is there any necessary limit to the goodness to which
positive, non-sinful, changes lead:
Now change is a perpetual movement toward a
different state. And it takes two forms.
In the one
case it is always directed toward the good; and here
its progress is continual, since there is no conceivable limit to the distance it can go. In the other
case it is directed toward the opposite, the essence
of which lies in nonexistence. (21:298)
Change itself, then, is a characteristic of the creatures
which come from the perfectly good God.

It cannot be

identified with evil.
3.3. Many thinkers and even religious figures
challenged the goodness of human nature, especially due to
its embodiment and its consequent "weakness."

We have

already seen Gregory's defence of the goodness of human
nature and its natural aspects.

He defends birth (13:290,

28:307) and even death or mortality (8:282-3, 32:309-310).
Nor are the punishments and pains by which we are weaned
from evil and restored to our share in divinity to be
equated with evil (8:284-5).
In sum, evil is not the nature of any created
reality, much less the nature of the creator.

It is the

privation of virtue:
no blame, indeed, would attach to evil, could it
claim God as its creator and father.
But evil in some
way arises from within. It has its origin in the will,
when the soul withdraws from the good. For as sight is
an activity of nature and blindness is a privation of
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natural activity, so virtue is in this way opposed to
vice. For the origin of evil is not otherwise to be
conceived than as the absence of virtue. (5:277-278)
Thus evil is more opposed to any positive reality than any
positive reality differs from any other positive reality:
we must not think of virtue as opposed to vice in the
way of two existing phenomena. To illustrate: nonbeing
is opposed to being; but we cannot say that the former
is opposed to the latter as something eisting in its
own right. Rather do we say that there is a logical
opposition between what does not exist and what exists.
In the same way vice is opposed to the principle of
virtue. (6:279 see also 7:282, 8:286, 15:291)
In short, evil as such is nothing positive at all.

Epistemological Reductionism
The last set of foils in LK which are important for
our purpose deal with the varying degrees in which human
attitudes are open to the fullness of reality.

Metaphysi-

cal views are generally correlated with appropriate

•

epistemological views.

We have just considered some of

Gregory's attacks on metaphysical views which deny some
dimension of reality and present a part or aspect as if it
were the whole.

Now we will take up his challenge to the

parallel epistemologies.

He challenges the acceptance of

any "finite" attitude of mind as unrestricted.

God has

created human beings to enjoy nothing less than his own
divine life.

There must then be a human attitude of mind

in which God's infinity is accessible.

We might compare a
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finite attitude to looking at the world through rose
colored glasses.

The problem arises when one wearing such

glasses asserts that what he sees and only that is real.
Gregory points up the limits in some attitudes which are
often taken as unrestricted.
4.1. Many thinkers implicitly or explicitly identified the nature of the real with the object of sensation.
Gregory attacked such identifications as improper; they
deny much that is real (7:281-282, 8:283 & 285).
4.2. Furthermore, Gregory rails against identifying
the nature of the real with that nature perceived by anyone
whose mind is not perfectly open to all truth.

We have

already seen (p. 45) that Gregory regards faith as the sole
attitude of mind and heart which is unrestrictedly open.*
Gregory engages in standard rhetorical slurring of those
who do not accept faith after his

demonstra~ion

falsity of their objections to faith.

of the

Gregory's "slurs"

have a consistency about them which suggests that they may
have substantial content.

Those who do not accept faith

are "unreasonable and shortsighted" (8:285), "little minds"
afflicted with "stupidity" (9:287) who "strongly oppose the
truth", who suffer "madness" "for their own deceit"
* Danielou, 31, as mentioned earlier, quotes Gregory's
Commentary on the Canticle of Canticles in this regard:
"when I gave up every finite mode of comprehension, then it
was that I found my Beloved by faith."
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(18:295).

They are people who take "too narrow a view of

things", and are are "so simple-minded as not to believe"
(25:302), and "narrow minded" (27:305); "they look only at
outward appearances" and are "very stubborn" (33:312).
It is interesting that Gregory reproaches unbelievers
for their failures in reason!

He does not attack them for

refusing to abdicate their rationality, but for having
abdicated it under the guise of giving it free rein.

Those

who restrict the range and depth of their minds and hearts,
will necessarily miss enjoyment of something of God's
perfection, something of the world's goodness.

They will

end in denials of the possibility of that by which restoration is alone possible, because their attitudes are not
"infinite."

Only an unrestrictedly open attitude can do

justice to reality since reality has infinity about it .

•
Conclusion
Gregory's philosophical foils comprise various ways of
overlooking some positive reality, such as God's unlimited
nature, or the value of some positive reality.

He opposes

any confusion between the present state of created things
and their nature.

CHAPTER IV
The Character of Gregory's Thinking as
Determined by Constrastive Projection

The presentation and grouping of Gregory's foils in
the previous chapter provides the material with which to
characterize the basic criteria which guide his thought.
our review of the secondary literature showed that Gregory
employs some opinions and concepts which are perhaps
inconsistent with a thorough orthodoxy, especially his
occasional references to human embodiment as incompatible
with spiritual growth.

Yet Gregory upholds the orthodox

teaching of the need for and goodness of the resurrection
of the body.

Is his rejection of the denial of the

resurrection of the body based on any reasonable grounds?
Or does he lack intellectual integrity?

• Gregory the
Has

thinker capitulated to Gregory the bishop (or to the pious
women in his family, as Cherniss suggests)?

our question

is thus whether or not Gregory's thinking is oriented by a
consistent and reasonable concern.

We will respond to this

question by identifying the concern - the set of criteria which guides Gregory's rejection in LK of various philosophically important foils.

We will then project the

character of the philosophy at which Gregory's thinking
75
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aims, even if he did not explicate many elements of that
philosophy.

Finally, we will evaluate the compatibility of

the basic concern of his thought with his Christian faith.

Contrastive Projection of His Thought's Basic Concern
Gregory's choice of philosophical foils reveals a
preoccupation with refusing unnecessary limitations,
whether in thought or life.

This basic concern of Greg-

ory's thought is manifest in his effort to hold together
two contrasts which were often collapsed into one or the
other.

It is important to stress that the difference of

spirit from matter is not one of the contrasts which guides
his critical thought.

Rather, these basic contrasts are

the difference of infinite and finite and the opposition
between evil and good.

He sees that a collapse of one into

the other jeopardizes both what he regards as an authentic
notion of infinity and also the authentic meaning of evil.
His thought is a quite consistent effort to balance these
two contrasts without reducing either to the other.
Given Gregory's predilection for Plato's insistence
upon the radical difference of spirit from matter, even
while he appropriates Aristotelean themes in the fashion of
his time, it is striking that his concerns are not focused
upon the difference of matter and spirit.

He often uses

the distinction of matter from spirit, but he uses it in
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the context of his treatment of the two options available
to spiritual creatures and the context of infinite goodness
in which such options occur.

He emphasizes the basic

goodness of the bodily world and all its characteristics.
Even those human characteristics, such as pain, death, and
sexual differentiation, which would not have existed had
not God foreseen the effects of sin in the world and
designed our nature so as to circumvent those effects, are
defended against any characterization as evil.

Likewise,

he def ends the weakness and changes characteristic of
humanity even apart from sin against charges that they are
inherently evil.

He insists that the immortality for which

we hope and which has been made available by the Incarnation is not solely a spiritual immortality.

It seems to be

his view that we possess an immortality of soul with or
without the Incarnation.

The Incarnation,

~f

appropriated

in faith, makes possible the integral immortality which
includes human embodiment, human knowledge and strength of
will.

This restoration is, perhaps, the preeminent sign of

infinite goodness.
Gregory deals with the body/spirit topics because he
is concerned to elucidate, insofar as is possible or called
for, the implications of infinity and especially the
possibilities inherent in infinite goodness.

He vigorously

opposes any reduction of infinity to finitude; thus he
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insists on the possibility of and the means whereby
creatures, especially human creatures, may enjoy unlimited
divine goodness.

The possibility and reality of human

divinization is crucial in Gregory's thought because its
denial is perhaps the greatest challenge to his belief in
the power, goodness, wisdom and justice of God.

If God's

goodness cannot accomplish human divinization, even in the
face of human sin, then there is no argument against an
ultimate collapse of finitude into evil as well as a
complete separation of God from creation.

The "infinity"

that would remain after such a collapse would be a false
infinite, an un-actualized and un-actualizable ideal.
Pagan Greek thought is probably centered on such a
false infinite.*

A necessitarianism is evident in its

treatment of the ideal or most concrete form of knowledge
as science, i.e., as aimed at the grasp of ,,ecessary
connections.

Since metaphysical views are logically

correlated with epistemological views, a necessitarian
epistemology implies a necessitarian metaphysics.

Thus,

* Clarke's "The Limitation of Act by Potency" details
the classical Greek equation of perfection with the
(de) finite rather than the in(de)finite. He attributes to
Nee-Platonism the advance to associating infinitude with
perfection and finitude with deficiency in perfection. On
185 he notes that Gregory's treatment of God as infinite is
not traditional within Christian circles.
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the real is that which is necessary in terms of itself.*
While LK does mention that God "was not, indeed,
driven by any necessity to form man" (5:276), it does not
contain an attack on the necessitarianism of Greek thought
as such.

Gregory's interests were not philosophical in a

technical sense.

But Gregory's exploration of the implica-

tions of authentic infinity could surely help both clarify
the character of necessitarianism and criticize it.
suggest how Gregory's emphasis can clarify it.

Let us

His

distinctions can highlight the connection between necessitarianism and the failure of the pagan Greeks to discover
the notion of creation ex nihilo and the possibility of
divine free choice implied by such creation.
Furthermore, Gregory's exploration of the implications of infinity could be developed into a criticism of

•
necessitarianism, to an exposition of its lack
of necessity.

For example, metaphysically, there is no rational

necessity to restrict one who is infinitely perfect from,
e.g., creating others ex nihilo by free choice for divinization.

There is no necessity that such a creation occur,

but there is no necessity that it not.

Likewise in

* It would take us far beyond the limits of our
thesis to make these comments more precise. We refer the
interested reader to a brief expansion in Robert Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason (Notre Dame, IN: U of ND,
1982), chapter two, "Pagan Divinity", pp. 12-20.
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epistemology, there is no necessity to treat scientific
knowledge as most concrete; a faith is possible which
yeilds what is darkness from a "necessitarian" scientific
attitude, but which is more concrete, or "infinite" than
such science.

And in ethics (or the phenomenoloy of

action), there is no need to explain away free choice; free
choice is impossible only for necessitarianism.

With an

authentic notion of infinity one can make sense of free
choice, whether for good (as creation) or for evil (as
creaturely sin).

Nor is it necessary to despair at the

occurrence of sin; since it is the effect of a finite
activity, it can be overcome, from within, by an act of
infinite gratuitous goodness.

Without an authentic notion

of infinity - such as that which Gregory safeguards creation, free choice, faith and salvation from radical
evils could not be understood except as

im~ossibilities.

Gregory's concern with the implications of infinite
goodness are also worked out in his positive view of the
change, weakness, and materiality implicated in the
Incarnation.
God.

Each of these finitudes can be attributed to

Of course, change, weakness, or embodiment, or

anything finite cannot be attributed to God's own nature.
But, and this is striking, they can be attributed to God in
his benevolence toward us in the Incarnation.

We cannot

rightly reduce God to that which he is necessarily or by
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nature.

Though God cannot act against his nature, that

nature, infinite goodness, is such as to allow for possibilities beyond its necessary actuality.

God can be

involved in true relationships with what is not himself.*
These "additional" attributes do not fill out any lack in
the infinitely perfect nature of God, since, by definition,
there is no lack in infinite perfection.

The attributes of

creator and incarnate savior which God acquires by his
choice to create and save us are non-necessary, though
quite reasonable, gratuitous characteristics.

Weakness,

change, and materiality can characterize the natures only
of beings which are not necessary; but they can even
characterize that whose nature is necessary.

This is

implied in a consistent notion of infinite good .

A Pluralistic, Personalistic Theism

•

Gregory's basic concern with the difference of
infinite and finite and the opposition of good and evil
leads toward a philosophical personalism, theism, and
pluralism.

It is beside the point that Gregory has not

provided the detailed philosophical analyses undertaken by

* Clarke's "What is Most and Least Relevant in the
Metaphysics of st. Thomas Today?", pp.432-433, argues that
Aquinas' denial that God has "real relations" to creatures
is consistent with the view offered here as Gregory's.
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twentieth century thinkers.*

His concerns, as manifested

in his choice of foils, show that such views, or at least a
number of their themes, are demanded by the direction of
his thought.

How is this the case?

Gregory's thought heads toward a personalism because
one of its constitutive contrasts, that of evil and good,
is attributable only to persons, i.e, beings with free
will.

Gregory's insistence upon God's respect for crea-

turely choices demonstrates how seriously he took free will
as revealing the character of man.

As pointed out above,

this differentiates Gregory's thought from the pagan Greek
failure to focus clearly on the notion of free choice.
Pagan ethics treated man not as person but as citizen
(whose actions were evaluated accordingly as praiseworthy
or blameworthy) of a polis or of the cosmos •

•
Gregory's thought must be both theistic
and pluralistic since evil is a possibility only for created persons,
i.e., beings whose existing is the result of the "change"
* We might mention Martin Buber's I and Thou (NY:
Scribners, 1970), E. Levinas' Totality and Infinity
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne, 1969), Vincent Miceli's Ascent to
Being: Gabriel Marcel's Philosophy of Communion (NY:
Desclee, 1965), E. Mounier's Personalism (Notre Dame, IN:
U of ND), and John MacMurray's Persons in Relation (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1979).
The Cappadocian characterization of the Trinitarian
hypostases as relations (see p. 37-38 above) could be seen
as the germ of a new personalist, metaphysical theory of
categories. The germ is merely a germ; it is not developed
in the areas of creaturely relationships.
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of creation.

His focus on the difference of evil from good

would make no sense if there were none of the beings to
which it applies, created beings.

Whether these creatures

are human or hyper-human does not much affect Gregory's
basic concerns; both are finite, good by nature, but by
nature capable of evil.

For there to be finite beings

there must be a creator, a divine being which is infinitely
good and perfect.

Hence Gregory's theism is consistent

with his rational concerns.

And if creaturely evil is a

possibility, creatures must have the power of self-determination in their relation to God.

They could not be

merely passing stages of a Neo-Platonically conceived
divine emanation process, nor merely the Stoic seminal
logoi striving for the unconnected resignation of the Sage
in the course of cosmic cycles, nor merely an Aristotelian

•
virtuous contemplative operating by his natural
power.
Rather creatures are respected in their differences by God
without thereby detracting anything from God - hence
Gregory's pluralism coheres with his critical criteria.
In sum, Gregory's foils manifest that his critical
thought is guided by a consistent set of criteria.

His

basic demand is that justice be done to the difference of
good and evil, to the difference of infinite and finite,
and to the irreducibility of these pairs to each other.
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Evaluation and Conclusion
Gregory's concern to consistently uphold the difference of finite from infinite marks him unambiguously as a
Christian thinker.

Gregory's foils constantly manifest his

concern for avoiding any reduction of the infinite to
something finite.

His focus upon the possibility of human

divinization shows an ethics or theory of human nature in
harmony with respect for authentic infinity (see the
footnote on p. 47 above).

His positive emphasis on faith

as our mode of access to the divine extends this concern to
epistemological matters: faith is, as Danielou's quotations
from Gregory's other works show, the mode of our openness
to infinity; attitudes other than faith are thus characterized as "finite" (see the footnote on p. 45 above).
Why was Gregory's central concern, as manifested in
his foils, overlooked by the thinkers who regard his
thinking as non-Christian?
Cherniss focuses upon Gregory's use of the contrast
of spirit and matter and interprets the entirety of
Gregory's thought accordingly (p. 4-6 above); he thereby
misses Harvanek's point (p. 14-15 above) that Gregory's
central concern is the difference of creature from creator,
i.e., of the finite from the infinite.
Harnack notes two poles in Gregory's thought, but
those two poles are the Aristotelian concern for the unity
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of soul and body and the Platonic concern for the spirit's
irreducibility to the material (p. 6 above).

Nowhere does

Harnack avert to Gregory's central concern with the
difference of finite from infinite (which is not the same
as matter from spirit) or with the opposition of evil and
good (which is also not identified with body and spirit).
Harnack's liberal Protestant and essentially individualist
disgust with Gregory's sacramental realism (pp. 6-7 above)
is akin to the disgust felt by many of the proponents of
Gregory's foils regarding the unworthiness of materiality
in reference to divinity.
Nygren does not note Gregory's characterization of
faith as receptive and as the only mode in which we can
enjoy the approach of the unapproachable; certainly he
misses the harmony of Gregory's notion of faith and his
concern with the implications of infinity, i:t.nd the "agapaic" God thereby defended.

There is no basic disagreement

between Gregory and Nygren on the character and role of
faith.

But Gregory's attempt to reconcile a purified form

of eros is at odds with Nygren's Lutheran a priori view
that agape is irreconcilable with any form of eros (p. 8
above). Gregory, in effect, would suggest that Nygren
limits God's ability to fashion creatures in his own image
and to help them actualize that image-character by restoration from sin.

This, of course, is a difference between
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Gregory and Nygren about what is authentic Christianity.
Stead tends to approach Gregory's works as if they
were definitive expressions of a basically theoretical
thought.

He overlooks the apologetic, rhetorical, and

catechetical intent of most of Gregory's works, of even the
most controversial.

As a result he lacks the context in

which to properly relate the various contrasts which
Gregory uses.

He treats the difference of perceptible from

intelligible (or matter from spirit) as of equal importance
to that of creature from creator (or finite from infinite)
(p. 9-10 above).

He accuses Gregory of an "uncritical

borrowing" of concepts; this accusation does not hold up if
our study of Gregory's foils is to the point.

Gregory knew

quite well the limits of the concepts which he borrowed,
and he highlighted those limits.
In conclusion, a summary of our results is in order.
Some critics have cast doubt on the rationality of Gregory's thought because he rejects concepts which had been
condemned by the Church while he uses concepts which are
logically

associated with the condemned.

They suggest

that Gregory criticizes concepts on fideistic or irrational
grounds.

To determine whether they are correct we asked

whether there is evidence of rational criteria (i.e. more
than a fideistic adherence to Church teaching) in Gregory's
critical thought.

Chapter Two presented Gregory's positive
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conception of the relation between the truth of Christian
faith and the character of philosophical error; his
"reasonable" conception of faith made it appear likely that
he does have rational criteria.
grouped his philosophical foils.

Chapter Three listed and
This chapter has identi-

fied his central concern as manifested in his choice of
foils.

It is to safeguard the difference of infinite and

finite and the distinct difference of good and evil.

Once

identified it should be clear that that concern - that set
of criteria - is consistent, reasonable and in accord with
orthodox Christian faith.

•
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